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THE PERRYMANDER, POLARIZATION, AND
PEYOTE v. SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT
Rosemarie Unite*
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 accomplished what the Fifteenth
Amendment alone could not: safeguarding minority voting rights. One
of the Act’s key enforcement provisions, Section 2, has helped protect
not only minorities’ access to the polls but also their right to an
undiluted vote against potentially discriminatory means such as
legislative redistricting. By prohibiting minority vote dilution even
when a legislative redistricting plan is drawn strictly for political gain,
Section 2 has also become one of the only checks on partisan
gerrymandering. Yet a certain confluence of circumstances puts Section
2 at risk of being either struck down by the Supreme Court as
unconstitutional, or eviscerated, leaving the narrower interpretation of
Section 2 that Chief Justice Roberts advocated when he worked at the
Justice Department. These circumstances—the polarization of
Congress, the ideological disposition of the Supreme Court, and the
changing composition of the electorate—threaten to squelch the
minority vote just as it amasses the potential to swing presidential
elections and, thus, the futures of the political parties.

* J.D. 2014, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Rice University. Thanks to
Professors Jessica Levinson and Justin Levitt for their help navigating the upheaval in Voting
Rights Act jurisprudence in the midst and wake of an election year. Thanks also to Professors
Richard Hasen and Spencer Overton for granting me early access to their work. Thank you to
Professors Allan Ides and Aimee Dudovitz for their insight into gray areas of the law, and to
Professor Susan Bakhshian for her excellent writing instruction. I am especially grateful to Robert
Shepard and Cameron Bell for their literary expertise and invaluable feedback, and to Leah
Johannesson for her painstaking efforts and patience. Special thanks go to Sean Hanle, Daniel
Straw, Diana Sfrijian, Jessica Mead, and their staffs for all of their hard work. My apologies go to
Michael Driscoll, Zack Muljat, Scott Klausner, Brett Safford, Diana De Leon, and Marleina Paz
for the logistics required to publish an article with the shelf life of an average campaign promise.
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“[T]he State took away the Latinos’ opportunity
because Latinos were about to exercise it.”
—Justice Kennedy, League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, a partisan gerrymander in Texas, orchestrated by thenHouse Majority Leader Tom DeLay, infamously prompted busloads
of Texas legislators to break quorum and flee the state—a failed
attempt to prevent the gerrymander’s enactment.2 Although the
Supreme Court in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry
(LULAC) refused to strike down the redistricting plan3 as an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander4—a claim that has never
succeeded in the Supreme Court5—the Court held that the plan
violated Section 2 (“Section 2”) of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by
diluting the voting strength of Latinos in one district.6 In Texas’s
Twenty-Third Congressional District (“District 23”), the growing
Latino community had given its incumbent Republican
representative less support with each successive election, so the
Republican-controlled Texas legislature drew districts to protect his
seat.7 As Justice Kennedy put it, “[T]he State took away the Latinos’
opportunity [to vote] because Latinos were about to exercise it.”8
Nevertheless,
DeLay’s
brazen9
partisan
gerrymandering
1. 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006).
2. The Texas House and Senate members who fled staged two separate walkouts, each
when DeLay’s redistricting plan reached the floor for a vote. STEVE BICKERSTAFF, LINES IN THE
SAND: CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING IN TEXAS AND THE DOWNFALL OF TOM DELAY 1, 141–
43, 191–94 (2007); see also Mark Gersh, Redistricting Journal: Showdown in Texas—Reasons
and Implications for the House, and Hispanic Vote, CBS NEWS (Sept. 21, 2011, 5:45 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/redistricting-journal-showdown-in-texas-reasons-and
-implications-for-the-house-and-hispanic-vote/ (discussing the redistricting battle in Texas).
3. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 416–23; BICKERSTAFF, supra note 2, at 385–86.
4. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 447. Because Texas redistricted in 2003, when the Republican Party
won a majority of the Texas Legislature, rather than immediately after the 2000 Census data
emerged, the redistricting map was challenged primarily as a partisan gerrymander, drawn for
political gain rather than to accommodate population changes in the state. Id. at 417.
5. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278–79 (2004). The only relief provided for an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander was a preliminary injunction by a lower court. Id. at 279.
6. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 403, 437, 443, 447.
7. Id. at 423–24.
8. Id. at 440.
9. Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan
Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626, 626 (2004); see Nicholas Kusnetz,
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masterpiece10 succeeded in entrenching Republican power in both
Texas and Congress, and essentially invited partisan gerrymanderers
across the country to draw district lines “as partisan as the law
allows.”11
Though the LULAC Court required Texas to redraw District 23
in 2006 to give the Latino community the ability to elect its preferred
candidate, the state took away that ability once again only a few
years later.12 In the rash of nationwide redistricting efforts spurred by
the 2010 Census and congressional midterm elections, thenRepublican Texas Governor Rick Perry orchestrated what has been
called the “Perrymander,”13 a “radical partisan gerrymander”14 that
Texas legislators admitted was even more ambitious than Tom
DeLay’s.15 Like its predecessor, the Perrymander diluted minorityvoting rights, but it used far more cunning methods.16 By redrawing
District 23 to maintain a bare majority of Latino voters within its
boundaries, the Texas legislature tried to make the district look
“functionally identical” to its previous composition as mandated by
the LULAC Court.17 In reality, however, the legislature replaced
active Latino voters in District 23 with inactive Latino voters,
effectively reducing Latino voting power while making it appear to
stay the same.18
Behind Closed Doors: GOP and Dems Alike Cloaked Redistricting in Secrecy, NBC NEWS
(Nov. 1, 2012, 6:35 AM), http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/11/01/14839356-behindclosed-doors-gop-and-dems-alike-cloaked-redistricting-in-secrecy (describing the “baldly
partisan warfare” of Texas’s 2003 redistricting plan and the resulting flight of state legislators).
10. BICKERSTAFF, supra note 2, at 384.
11. Id. at 84. “Republicans have won all of Texas’s statewide offices since 1994, the longest
streak of single-party dominance in the country.” Neil King, Jr., Deep in the Red of Texas,
Republicans Fight the Blues, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424127887324883604578397021579876246.html.
12. Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 154 (D.D.C. 2012).
13. David Wasserman, ‘Perrymander’: Redistricting Map That Rick Perry Signed Has Texas
Hispanics up in Arms, NAT’L J. (Aug. 22, 2011, 11:03 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com
/politics/-perrymander-redistricting-map-that-rick-perry-signed-has-texas-hispanics-up-in-arms20110819.
14. Perez v. Perry, 835 F. Supp. 2d 209, 217 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated 132 S. Ct. 934,
remanded to 891 F. Supp. 2d 808 (W.D. Tex. 2012).
15. Gersh, supra note 2.
16. See Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 155–56.
17. Id. at 155; see Justin Levitt, Professor, Loyola Law Sch., Los Angeles, Remarks at the
Voting Rights Act and Redistricting Panel at the George Washington University Law School
Symposium: Law and Democracy (Nov. 16, 2012) at 24:35 [hereinafter Levitt Symposium],
available at http://vimeo.com/user9108723/review/55780860/5749aec1a9.
18. Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 155.
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By 2010, however, Texas was a much different state: minority
groups collectively made up a majority of the population.19 In fact,
the 2010 census showed not only that the population had grown by
over four million new residents—earning the state four additional
seats in Congress and thus prompting the redistricting—but also that
those new residents were overwhelmingly non-white and 65 percent
Latino.20
Despite—or because of—this huge minority population growth,
the Texas legislature strategically crafted the Perrymander to ensure
that minorities would not be able to elect their preferred candidates
in any of the state’s four new congressional districts.21 Though the
burgeoning Latino population, in particular, might have translated to
increased Latino representation in Congress, once again Texas took
away Latinos’ voting power just as they were about to exercise it.22
If the current Section 2 challenge to the Perrymander23 proves that
19. Gersh, supra note 2; Ryan Lizza, The Party Next Time, NEW YORKER (Nov. 19, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/11/19/121119fa_fact_lizza (citing a 55 percent
minority population according to Steve Munisteri, chairman of the Republican Party of Texas).
20. Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 156; see Gersh, supra note 2.
21. Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 155, 178.
22. See id. at 160. Though a minority group’s representation in Congress is not required to
be proportional to its population, the Perrymander widened the gap between the minority
population and its representation, which led the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia to conclude that the redistricting plan diluted minority voting rights. Id. at 158–59.
23. Two challenges to the Perrymander were brought under the VRA: a Section 2 challenge
in federal district court in San Antonio, Perez v. Perry, 835 F. Supp. 2d 209 (W.D. Tex. 2011),
vacated 132 S. Ct. 934, remanded to 891 F. Supp. 2d 808 (W.D. Tex. 2012), and a Section 5
challenge in federal district court in Washington, D.C., Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d
133 (D.D.C. 2012). See infra Part II.A, for more on Section 5 and preclearance. This Article
focuses on the Section 2 challenge in the San Antonio court, although the Section 5 action has
played an important part in its proceedings.
While awaiting the D.C. court’s decision in the Section 5 case, the San Antonio court
stayed the proceedings of the Section 2 challenge in November 2011 and drew interim
redistricting maps for Texas to use in the meantime for the 2012 elections. Perez v. Perry,
835 F. Supp. 2d 209 (W.D. Tex. 2011), vacated 132 S. Ct. 934, remanded to 891 F. Supp. 2d 808
(W.D. Tex. 2012). The Supreme Court, however, ordered the San Antonio court to redraw its
interim maps to reflect the Perrymander’s original lines, except in those districts that the district
court ascertained would have a “reasonable probability” of being denied Section 5 preclearance
by the D.C. court. Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012) (per curiam) (clarifying the legal standard
to be used in drawing interim maps awaiting preclearance). Texas then used the redrawn interim
maps (the “Revised Perrymander”) in its 2012 elections. Perez v. Perry, 2014 WL 2740352, at *1
(W.D. Tex. June 17, 2014).
On June 23, 2013, the Texas legislature passed maps virtually identical to the Revised
Perrymander (the “2013 Perrymander”) for its 2014 elections. Ross Ramsey and Julián Aguilar,
Feds Seek to Restore Voting Law Restrictions on Texas, TEXAS TRIBUNE, July 25, 2013,
http://www.texastribune.org/2013/07/25/holder-seeks-restore-preclearance-requirement.
Texas
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the Texas legislature once again diluted Latino voting rights, the
state will have to redraw its maps again to more effectively represent
Latino voting preferences, which have leaned fiercely Democratic
for at least three decades.24
This time, though, more serious consequences are at stake for
the Republican Party. If Latinos increase their ability to elect their
candidates of choice, Republicans risk losing their grip on power in
Texas, a longtime party stronghold.25 With a Latino population that
will form a plurality in the state by 2014 and a majority by 2020,26
Texas reflects a general transformation of the electorate across the
country.27 If most Latinos continue to prefer voting for Democratic
candidates28 the 50,000 Latinos nationwide who reach voting age
then moved to dismiss the Section 2 case, arguing that the passage of the 2013 Perrymander
rendered the claims moot by replacing the Perrymander, which was the subject of the plaintiffs’
complaints. See Chris Tomlinson, Redistricting Case Could Delay Texas Primaries, HOUS.
CHRON., Aug. 11, 2013, http://www.chron.com/news/texas/article/Redistricting-case-could
-delay-Texas-primaries-4723999.php.
On September 6, 2013, the San Antonio court ruled that the claims against the
Perrymander were not moot, noting that
[t]he fact that the Legislature has adopted the Court’s interim plans in an attempt to
curb this particular litigation is no assurance that it will not engage in the same conduct
in the next legislative session or any session thereafter. Thus, a dispute remains over
the challenged practices, there is no assurance that the conduct will not recur, and
Plaintiffs maintain a personal stake in the controversy.
Perez v. Perry, No. 11–CA–360–OLG–JES–XR, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 4784195, at *7 (W.D. Tex.
Sept. 6, 2013) (order granting plaintiffs’ request to amend their pleadings and denying
defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims as moot).
24. SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER
SUPPRESSION 69, 110–11 (2007); Mark Hugo Lopez & Paul Taylor, Latino Voters in the 2012
Election, PEW RESEARCH HISPANIC CTR. (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org
/2012/11/07/latino-voters-in-the-2012-election (chart showing Democratic advantage of at least
eighteen points since 1980).
25. Emily Bazelon, Has the South Risen Above Racist Voting Laws?, SLATE (Nov. 19, 2012,
4:10 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/11/supreme_court
_voting_rights_act_2012_will_the_2012_election_lead_the_justices.single.html.
26. Lizza, supra note 19 (quoting Steve Munisteri, Chairman of the Republican Party of
Texas).
27. Sudeep Reddy, Latinos Fuel Growth in Decade, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704604704576220603247344790; Hope
Yen, High Court Poised to Upend Civil Rights Policies, GATEWAY NEWS, Mar. 31, 2013,
http://www.thegatewaynews.com/ap%20washington/2013/03/29/high-court-poised-to-upend-civil
-rights-policies (“The District of Columbia, Hawaii, California, New Mexico, and Texas already
have populations of racial and ethnic minorities that collectively add up to more than 50
percent.”); Adolfo Flores, Latinos to Make Up Plurality of Californians by 2014, Report Finds,
L.A. TIMES: L.A. NOW (Jan. 31, 2013, 12:08 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2013/01
/latinos-to-make-up-majority-of-california-by-end-of-2013.html.
28. E.g., Lizza, supra note 19.
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every month for the next twenty years29 present particularly grave
implications for the Republican Party.30
Nowhere is this fact more critical than in Texas, which has the
second-largest number of electoral votes in a presidential race.31
Texas Republican Senator Ted Cruz32 warned that if his party cannot
convince Latinos to vote Republican, Texas will become a blue
state.33 If that happens, simple math will deliver an inexorable truth:
the Republican Party would no longer be able to elect a president.34
Without Texas, Republicans cannot amass the 270 electoral votes
needed to win the White House.35 At that point, as Republican-Party
29. Charlie Cook, For Republicans, Just Doing the Math Is Frightening, NAT’L J. (Jan. 18,
2013, 5:39 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/cook-report/for-republicans-just-doing
-the-math-is-frightening-20130117; see also Sylvia R. Lazos, Latino Voters 2012 and Beyond:
Will the Fastest Growing and Evolving Electoral Group Shape U.S. Politics?, 11 ELECTION L.J.
118, 119 (2012) (reaching similar conclusions but estimating 200,000 Latinos turn eighteen each
month).
30. David Lauter, Nonwhite Voters and Cultural Shifts Make 2012 Election Pivotal, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2012, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-election-20121111
,0,2275455.story; Gerald F. Seib, Tough Loss Leaves GOP at a Crossroads, WALL ST. J.
Nov. 7, 2012,http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203347104578099361429
17912; Michael D. Shear, As Electorate Changes, Fresh Worry for G.O.P., N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/obamas-victory-presents-gop-with
-demographic-test.html?pagewanted=all&_r =0; Derek Thompson, Two Graphs That Should
Accompany Every Discussion of the GOP’s Demographics Problem, THE ATLANTIC
(Nov. 9, 2012, 2:39 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com /politics/archive/2012/11/2-graphs-thatshould-accompany-every-discussion-of-the-gops-demographics-problem/265032;
Allison
Kopicki & Will Irving, Assessing How Pivotal the Hispanic Vote Was to Obama’s Victory, N.Y.
TIMES: THE CAUCUS (Nov. 20, 2012, 4:16 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/20
/assessing-how-pivotal-the-hispanic-vote-was-to-obamas-victory.
31. Texas has thirty-eight electoral votes, second only to California’s fifty-five. Lizza, supra
note 19.
32. Senator Cruz is the former Solicitor General of Texas who defended DeLay’s partisan
gerrymander before the Supreme Court in LULAC. BICKERSTAFF, supra note 2, at 386.
33. Lizza, supra note 19 (quoting Julián Castro, the Democratic mayor of San Antonio:
“Within the next six to eight years . . . I believe Texas will be at least a purple state, if not a blue
state.”); Kevin Sack & Sarah Wheaton, G.O.P. Strains to Define How to Close Gap with Voters,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/us/politics/first-republicans
-must-find-common-ground-among-themselves.html?pagewanted=all (quoting Emory University
political scientist Alan I. Abramowitz: “Texas is going to become a swing state. And if Texas
becomes a swing state, it’s all over.”); Ann Beeson, Texas Could Become a Swing State Sooner
Than You Think, N.Y. TIMES: CAMPAIGN STOPS (Nov. 6, 2012, 10:23 PM),
http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/06/e-day/#.
34. Cook, supra note 29; Lizza, supra note 19 (assuming California and New York will
remain Democratic for the foreseeable future); William Yeomans, GOP v. Voting Rights Act,
REUTERS: GREAT DEBATE (Jan. 10, 2013, 2:29 AM), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013
/01/10/gop-v-voting-rights-act.
35. See Cook, supra note 29; Lizza, supra note 19 (quoting Sen. Cruz: “New York and
California are for the foreseeable future unalterably Democrat. If Texas turns bright blue, the
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leaders have already acknowledged, the Grand Old Party (GOP) will
meet the fate of the Whig Party.36
The GOP has tried to forestall this grim trajectory by playing
both offense and defense. On the one hand, some Republicans have
found a “new appreciation” for issues important to Latinos, such as
immigration reform.37 On the other hand, the party has also
redoubled its defensive measures to retain power,38 such as
implementing strict voter-ID and registration laws as well as
restricting early voting.39 Undeniably, the GOP’s greatest success has
come from its coordinated, nationwide, partisan-gerrymandering
effort—of which the Perrymander is merely one part—ensuring a
Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives for the
next decade.40
Electoral College math is simple. . . you can’t get to two-seventy electoral votes. The Republican
Party would cease to exist.”).
36. See Robert Draper, Can the Republicans Be Saved From Obsolescence?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Feb. 14, 2013, at MM24; Lizza, supra note 19.
37. King, Jr., supra note 11 (citing the Texas GOP’s request that its local chapters stop
holding party meetings at country clubs and start hosting recruiting tables at naturalization
ceremonies); Karl Rove, About That ‘Permanent Democratic Majority’, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31,
2013, at A13 (arguing that Republicans can win more Latino votes with changes in policy, more
Latino candidates, and “better messaging”); Julia Preston, Senators Offer a New Blueprint for
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/us/politics/senators
-agree-on-blueprint-for-immigration.html?pagewanted=all (quoting Republican Senator John
McCain, explaining the difference between 2013 and 2010, when a similar immigration bill
failed: “Look at the last election . . . . We are losing dramatically the Hispanic vote.”). But see
Lisa Mascaro, GOP Promise of Immigration Reform Fades a Year After Election, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigration-gop-20131130,0,3679179.story
(“[Speaker of the House John] Boehner, if he kills off immigration reform, will be remembered as
the speaker who killed the GOP.”).
38. Ari Berman, Why Are Conservatives Trying to Destroy the Voting Rights Act?, THE
NATION (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.thenation.com/article/172685/why-are-conservatives-trying
-destroy-voting-rights-act (“GOP . . . has responded to demographic change by trying to suppress
an increasingly diverse electorate.”); see Yeomans, supra note 34.
39. E.g., Berman, supra note 38.
40. With REDMAP (REDistricting MAjority Project), the Republican State Leadership
Committee (RSLC) has implemented a successful strategy of controlling redistricting in state
legislatures across the country, resulting in a thirty-three-seat majority for the Republican Party in
the House despite losing the popular vote to Democrats by over a million votes in 2012. To that
end, the RSLC also spent $750,000 in Texas to gain the four new congressional seats in the
Perrymander. 2012 REDMAP Summary Report, REDISTRICTING MAJORITY PARTY (Jan. 4, 2013,
9:13 AM), http://www.redistrictingmajorityproject.com/?p=64.
Another defensive method the GOP attempted to implement was to change the way states
award electoral votes in a presidential race. Instead of awarding all electoral votes to the winner
of the presidential race in the state at-large, states would award the votes according to the winner
of the presidential race within each Congressional district—that is, the same Congressional
districts that have been gerrymandered along partisan lines to deliver a Republican majority. Neil
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But successful partisan redistricting often comes at the expense
of minority voting rights, as Texas’s VRA violations demonstrate.41
Minority Texas lawmakers have, in fact, referred to the state’s
redistricting plan and its voter-ID law as “‘a textbook example’ of
why the Voting Rights Act is needed in Texas.”42 Scholars view the
legal challenges to the Perrymander as probative of the nationwide
VRA debate,43 if not as a warning of how racial discrimination in
redistricting will become routine without full-scale enforcement of
the VRA.44
Indeed, the VRA remains crucial in protecting minority voting
rights going forward, notwithstanding the unprecedented power of
the minority vote exercised in the 2012 election.45 Minorities’
newfound voting strength is predicated on a foundation of equal
access to the polls and undiluted votes, yet an overwhelming number
of racially discriminatory voting laws were enacted heading into the
2012 election, fracturing that foundation.46 In fact, since the 2010
midterm elections, more challenges have been filed under the VRA
King, Jr., Move to Split Electoral Votes Proves Divisive, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323854904578264102403098718; Paul
West, GOP Faces Hurdles in Challenging Voting Laws, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2013, at A8.
41. “In the last four decades, Texas has found itself in court every redistricting cycle, and
each time it has lost.” Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 161 (D.D.C. 2012); see also
LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006) (“[T]he redrawing of the district lines was damaging
to the Latinos in District 23. The State not only made fruitless the Latinos’ mobilization efforts
but also acted against those Latinos who were becoming most politically active.”).
42. Peggy Fikac, Turner Urges AG to Drop Voting Rights Act Challenge, HOUS. CHRON.:
TEXAS POLITICS (Feb. 25, 2013), http://blog.chron.com/texaspolitics/2013/02/turner-urges-ag-todrop-voting-rights-act-challenge (quoting Rep. Trey Martinez Fischer, San Antonio Democrat
and head of the Mexican American Legislative Caucus).
43. Ellen Katz, Professor, Univ. of Mich., Remarks at the Voting Rights Act and
Redistricting Panel at the George Washington University Law School Symposium: Law and
Democracy: A Symposium on Political Law (Nov. 16, 2012) at 10:50 [hereinafter Katz
Symposium], available at http://vimeo.com/user9108723/review/55780860/5749aec1a9. See
infra Part IV, for discussion of the VRA debate.
44. See Levitt Symposium, supra note 17, at 24:35 (discussing the blatant discrimination in
the Texas redistricting plan even with Section 5 of the VRA still in effect). See infra Part II.A, for
more on Section 5.
45. See Lauter, supra note 30; Shear, supra note 30; Paul West, No Longer Your Father’s
Electorate, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/08/nation/la-naanalysis-20121108.
46. Berman, supra note 38; Nathaniel Persily, Is the Voting Rights Act Doomed?, N.Y.
TIMES: CAMPAIGN STOPS (Nov. 14, 2012, 8:58 PM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com
/2012/11/14/is-the-voting-rights-act-doomed (discussing laws struck down before the 2012
election under Section 5 of the VRA for retrogressing the voting rights of minorities); Yeomans,
supra note 34.
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than in the previous forty-five years combined.47 Just as the minority
vote is finding its strength, concerted efforts are aiming to sap it. As
a result, the VRA remains vitally necessary to make sure that
minorities’ nascent voting power is not taken away just as they are
about to exercise it.
Yet, the Supreme Court is dismantling the VRA. The Court’s
recent gutting of Section 548 leaves Section 2 as the only remaining
comprehensive provision to enforce the statute.49 Now Section 2
47. Drew Singer, Court Rejects Texas Redistricting Maps, REUTERS, Aug. 28, 2012,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/28/us-usa-texas-voter-id
-idUSBRE87R14020120828.
48. On June 25, 2013, in an Alabama case, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Section 4 of
the VRA, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013)
(holding Section 4 unconstitutional for violating states’ rights to “equal sovereignty” because its
formula for determining jurisdictions subject to Section 5 no longer accounted for “current
conditions”). Because Section 5, “the brain” of the VRA, is inoperable without Section 4, the
Shelby ruling left Section 5 still on the books but “a zombie.” Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The
Walking Dead Supreme Court, HUFFINGTON POST (July 2, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/ciara-torresspelliscy/the-walking-dead-supreme-_b_3535208.html. See infra Part II.A, for more
about Section 5 and its coverage formula.
The day after the Court issued its Shelby ruling, then-Texas Governor Rick Perry signed
into law the 2013 Perrymander. Perez v. Perry, No. 11–CA–360–OLG–JES–XR, 2013 U.S. Dist.
WL 4784195, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2013); see supra note 23. The next day, the Court vacated
and remanded the Section 5 challenge to the original 2011 Perrymander in light of its invalidation
of Section 4. Texas v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2885, 2885 (2013).
49. After the Shelby ruling gutted Section 5, some plaintiffs in the Section 2 case against the
Perrymander moved for leave to amend their claims in the district court in San Antonio. Perez,
2013 U.S. Dist. WL 4784195, at *4. These plaintiffs added claims against the 2013 Perrymander
as well as claims challenging the original 2011 Perrymander under Section 3 of the VRA. Id. 42
U.S.C. 1973a(c). On July 25, 2013, one month after the Shelby ruling, the U.S. Department of
Justice filed a statement of interest in the case, also asking to “bail-in” Texas under Section 3.
Perez, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 4784195, at *4; Eric Holder, Att’y General, U.S. Department of
Justice, Address at the National Urban League Annual Conference (July 25, 2013) (transcript
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-130725.html). Section 3,
however, is not a comprehensive enforcement provision like Section 2. See Travis Crum, Note,
The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: The Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic
Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 1997 (2010), available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org
/images/pdfs/895.pdf.
Section 3 is an “obscure” provision of the VRA that operates as a remedy for violations of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, see id., by providing for jurisdictions to get “bailedin” and thus be subject to the federal oversight that preclearance demands. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a
(2006). Until now, Section 3 has been “ignored” in favor of Section 5’s broader protections, in
part because the VRA’s original coverage formula captured many of the jurisdictions with
discriminatory voting practices and required that voting changes be precleared. See Crum, supra,
at 1997; Rick Hasen, Why AG Holder’s Decision to “Bail In” Texas Under the Voting Rights Act
Is a Big Deal, Legally and Legislatively, Post-Shelby County, ELECTION LAW BLOG
(July 25, 2013, 9:03 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=53425 [hereinafter Hasen, Bail In].
Section 3 would give the San Antonio court the discretion to require Texas once again to
preclear voting changes as it did under Section 5, pre-Shelby. Hasen, Bail In, supra. See infra Part
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itself is vulnerable to being struck down or gutted by the Court.50
This Article argues that a confluence of political polarization in both
Congress and the Supreme Court may threaten Section 2, precisely at
a time when it is most needed to ensure that minority voters—and
their growing importance to election outcomes—are courted, not
thwarted.
Part II provides a brief background on the VRA and its
enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment. It also explains how the
Supreme Court gutted Section 2 by statutory interpretation in 1980,51
and how Congress passed a legislative override of that decision in
1982, making Section 2 more powerful but also problematic.52 Part
III argues that, if the Court eviscerates Section 2 again, a polarized
and gridlocked Congress—thanks, in part, to partisan
gerrymandering—would no longer be able to muster a legislative
II.A, for more on preclearance. This “bail-in” remedy, however, would require the plaintiffs to
prove that the Texas Legislature intentionally discriminated against them, which is a tougher
standard to meet than under Section 5, Hasen, Bail In, supra, or under Section 2. Adam Serwer,
The Secret Weapon That Could Save the Voting Rights Act, MSNBC.com (July 8, 2013, 12:36
PM), http://tv.msnbc .com/2013/07/08/sec-3-the-secret-weapon-for-protecting-minority-voters
(“[U]nder Section 2, unlike Section 3, you need to prove only that changes will adversely affect
minorities, not that they were intended to.”). See infra Parts II.A, II.B.3.
Section 3 is also limited because its application is discretionary and allows the court to
restrict the scope of preclearance as it sees fit, such as only for redistricting actions or only for a
limited period of time. See Richard L. Hasen, Holder’s Texas-Size Gambit: Will It Save the
Voting Rights Act?, NAT’L LAW JOURNAL (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.nationallawjournal.com
/id=1202613130666. Finally, because Section 3 is a remedial provision, it must be added on to
other voting rights claims, such as the Section 2 challenge to the Perrymander in San Antonio.
See Richard Pildes, Enforcement of Section 3 of the VRA: The Second Phase?, ELECTION LAW
BLOG (Aug. 1, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p =53839; see also Crum, supra, at
2009 (“Initiated as a section 2 suit, section 3 requires a court to find . . . a constitutional
violation.”).
Because Section 3 case law is sparse, questions abound regarding the procedures and
parameters of the provision. Authorities agree, however, that Section 3 claims will likely end up
at the Supreme Court for interpretation. See Lyle Denniston, Texas Fights New Voting
Supervision, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 6, 2013, 4:02 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/08/texas
-fights-new-voting-supervision.
Thus Section 2 is the VRA’s most comprehensive enforcement provision in operation.
50. Zachary Roth, Conservatives Prepare to Finish Off Voting Rights Act, MSNBC.COM
(July 19, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/07/19/conservatives-prepare-to-finish-offthe-voting-rights-act; see Richard Hasen, Texas Ups the Ante in Fight over Voting Rights Act,
Betting on an Emboldened Conservative Supreme Court, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Aug. 7, 2013,
9:28 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=54118, Sam Bagenstos, A Test of Seriousness For Those
Who Say Section 2 Is Sufficient, ELECTION LAW BLOG (July 17, 2013, 9:26 PM),
http://electionlawblog.org/?p=53131; Katz Symposium, supra note 43, at 1:09:32.
51. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1980), superseded by statute, Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
52. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
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override.53 It also explains how Section 2, by prohibiting the effect of
minority vote dilution, became one of the only ways to keep partisan
gerrymandering in check.54 Part IV argues that Section 2 may not
withstand constitutional scrutiny under a congruence and
proportionality test in the current Supreme Court, but that if the
Court wanted to uphold the statute, it would have several arguments
available to do so. Part V argues that the current polarization of the
Court makes it likely that Section 2 will either be gutted again or
declared unconstitutional.55 It also argues that Chief Justice Roberts,
not Justice Kennedy, may end up being the swing vote in what would
likely be a politically charged case. This part also points out that the
end of protections for minority voting rights, and the harm that
would result, is not merely theoretical: it has happened before.
Finally, Part VI concludes that, if the Section 2 challenge to the
Perrymander reaches the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts may
face a problem in how his vote at the Court may be perceived.
Whether deserved or not, the Chief Justice may be seen as protecting
minority voting rights at the expense of his party, or protecting his
party at the expense of minority voting rights and, quite possibly, the
legitimacy of the Court. Because minorities are becoming crucial to
election outcomes, his vote may determine far more than the fate of
Section 2.

53. See Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court,
and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209 (2013).
54. See Emily Bazelon, It’s Appalling That Gerrymandering Is Legal, SLATE (Nov. 9, 2012,
5:14 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/11/the_supreme_
/court_may_gut_the_voting_rights_act_and_make_gerrymandering.html;
Heather
Gerken,
Coloring Inside the Lines, SLATE (Nov. 10, 2010, 4:16 PM), http://www.slate.com
/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/11/coloring_inside_the _lines.html.
55. Brentin Mock, Why the Voting Rights Act Likely Won’t Survive Supreme Court Review,
THE NATION: VOTING RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 14, 2012, 11:23 AM), http://www.thenation.com
/blog/171241/why-voting-rights-act-likely-wont-survive-supreme-court-review# (“[Chief Justice
Roberts] sounded every alarm about why the discriminatory effect clause shouldn’t happen.”); see
Richard L. Hasen, Roberts’s Iffy Support for Voting Rights, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005,
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/03/opinion/oe-hasen3.

1088

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1075

II. BACKGROUND OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965
“There goes the South for a generation.”56
—President Lyndon B. Johnson, as he signed the
Voting Rights Act of 1965
The VRA, often cited as one of the twentieth century’s most
successful pieces of legislation,57 accomplished what the Fifteenth
Amendment could not on its own—the protection of minority voting
rights.58 Though the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870,
racism in the South proved to be too strong, and the Supreme Court
too uncommitted,59 for African-Americans to be able to vote
unhindered.60 As a result, their disenfranchisement continued for
almost a hundred more years, perpetrated by violence, voting fraud,
and political processes like gerrymandering and at-large elections, all
coordinated to prevent African-Americans from voting and being
elected.61 Not until the Civil Rights movement was the VRA finally
passed62 to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, which states:
§ 1 The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.
56. Civil
Rights
Act
Turns
40,
CBS
NEWS
(Dec. 5, 2007, 3:18 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/civil-rights-act-turns-40/.
57. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, Editors’ Introduction to
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE, at i (Bernard
Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) [hereinafter CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING];
see also Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Understanding the Paradoxical Case of the Voting Rights Act, 36
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 763 (2009) (calling the VRA “the crown jewel of the civil rights
movement”).
58. See Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING, supra note 57, at 7.
59. Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2341, 2356 (2003) [hereinafter Katz] (citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) and
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876)).
60. Davidson, supra note 58, at 9–11. Although Congress passed measures at the time to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court essentially gutted them. See infra Part V.
61. See id. at 10–11.
62. Legislation passed in 1957, 1960, and 1964 all proved ineffective to protect minority
voting rights. Then President Lyndon Johnson asked for the “goddamnedest toughest” voting bill,
which became the VRA. Davidson, supra note 58, at 17.
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§ 2 The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.63
To enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, the VRA provides for
government oversight of electoral practices across the country64 to be
carried out mainly through its two major provisions, Section 5 and
Section 2.65 Both sections prohibit new voting laws that would have
the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race.66 Though Section 5 is no longer operational,67 an understanding
of its function is fundamental to understanding the abilities and
vulnerabilities of Section 2.
A. Section 5 of the VRA
Section 5 of the VRA enforced the prohibition against denying
or abridging the right to vote by requiring certain jurisdictions with a
history of racial discrimination to submit any new voting standard,
practice, or procedure for preclearance to the Attorney General of the
United States or the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.68 The jurisdiction would have the burden of proving that
its new voting law would not cause backsliding in minority voting
rights.69 Because Section 5 required states to obtain federal approval
before implementing a state or local law,70 it stirred controversy as
an “uncommon exercise of congressional power” with a decisive
lack of deference to the state.71 Undeterred, the Warren Court upheld

63. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
64. Tom Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Keynote
Address at George Washington University Law Symposium on Political Law, (Nov. 16, 2012) at
24:34, available at http://vimeo.com/user9108723/review/55788542/08da95f2a6.
65. Richard H. Pildes, Voting Rights: The Next Generation, in RACE, REFORM, AND
REGULATION OF THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 17, 20 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles et al. eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2011).
66. Id.
67. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2648 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The
Court stops any application of § 5 by holding that § 4(b)’s coverage formula is
unconstitutional.”); see supra note 48.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006).
69. Id.; Justin Levitt, Bringing Sweats to the Court, AM. CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (Feb. 26,
2013), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/bringing-sweats-to-the-court.
70. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (explaining that “freezing election
procedures” until they are precleared was a necessary response to jurisdictions gaming the system
to pass new discriminatory laws as soon as the old ones were struck down).
71. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966).
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Section 5 in 1966 in the seminal case South Carolina v. Katzenbach72
because of the “exceptional conditions” surrounding voting
discrimination when Congress enacted the VRA.73
Since the VRA was passed, the immense progress achieved in
the South for minority voting rights is principally due to Section 5:74
it prevented discriminatory practices—such as literacy tests, reregistration requirements, and gerrymandering75—from being
implemented. Indeed, Section 5 prevented covered jurisdictions from
implementing any new practice or procedure, unless a jurisdiction
could prove that the proposed law would not detrimentally affect
minority voting rights.76 By circumventing the often protracted route
of a private plaintiff bringing suit in the regular course of litigation,
Section 5’s preclearance regime broke the cycle of jurisdictions
enacting new discriminatory laws as soon as the previous laws were
challenged.77 The significant increases in voter registration among
minorities and the record number of minorities elected to public
office in the last four decades are a testament to the effectiveness of
Section 5.78 Section 5 has been equally effective in recent years by
preventing the implementation of discriminatory laws such as a
restrictive photo identification requirement in South Carolina, the
reduction of early voting days in Florida, and the Perrymander’s
dilutive redistricting plan in Texas, all in the months leading up to
the 2012 general election.79
72. Id. at 308.
73. Id. at 335.
74. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No.
12-96) [hereinafter Shelby Transcript] (statement of Solicitor General Verrilli); Robert Barnes,
Supreme Court Considers South’s Legacy and Progress on Voting Rights, WASH. POST, Feb. 23,
2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-considers-souths-legacy-and
-progress-on-voting-rights/2013/02/23/3f1ba416-7c71-11e2-82e8-61a46c2cde3d_story.html.
75. See Davidson, supra note 58, at 22–23.
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).
77. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) (“[C]ase-by-case litigation
was inadequate to combat widespread and persistent discrimination in voting, because of the
inordinate amount of time and energy required to overcome the obstructionist tactics invariably
encountered in these lawsuits.”); Shelby Transcript, supra note 74, at 14 (statement of Justice
Sotomayor).
78. Barnes, supra note 74 (quoting Alabama state Representative John Knight).
79. Yeomans, supra note 34. Yet in the wake of the Shelby decision, all three of these states,
plus at least three others, passed harsh voting restrictions within two months. William R.
Hanauer, Community View: All Must Demand Congress Restore Voting Rights Act, LOHUD.COM
(Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.lohud.com/article/20130824/OPINION/308240032; see also Lizette
Alvarez, Ruling Revives Florida Review of Voter Rolls, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2013,
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Three days after the 2012 general election, however, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to an Alabama case in which
petitioners alleged that Section 5 was unconstitutional.80 At the same
hour that the statue of Rosa Parks was unveiled in the Capitol, the
Justices across the street heard oral argument on whether to strike
down Section 5 of the VRA,81 the “crown jewel of the civil rights
movement.”82 For over one hundred years, the Supreme Court had
not invalidated a civil rights law.83 In June 2013, the Court
eviscerated Section 5.84
B. Section 2 of the VRA
Section 2 of the VRA also prohibits laws that have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote due to race or color, but it does
so in a way that invites less controversy than Section 5.85 Unlike
Section 5, which applies to just a handful of jurisdictions with a
history of discrimination, Section 2 applies to all jurisdictions across
the country, making it impervious to the equal sovereignty arguments
leveled at Section 5.86 Section 2 also presents less of an intrusion on
states’ rights than Section 5 for three main reasons. First, Section 2
places the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that a voting
standard, practice, or procedure has a racially discriminatory effect,
rather than placing the burden on the jurisdiction to prove

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/08/us/ruling-revives-florida-review-of-voting-rolls.html
(explaining that Florida, Texas, and other states “seized on the Supreme Court ruling to advance
legislation calling for tougher voting rules or oversight”).
80. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
81. Bill Press, Americans Risk Losing Our Most Sacred Right, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 2013,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-201302281800--tms--bpresstt--m-a2013022820130228,0
,5344718.column.
82. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 57, at 763.
83. J. Gerald Hebert & Armand Derfner, Shelby County, Alabama and the Supreme Court,
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. BLOG (Feb. 28, 2013, 7:07 AM), http://www.clcblog.org/index
.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=505:shelby-county-alabama-and-the-supreme-court.
84. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (holding that Section 4 of the VRA, which determines
which jurisdictions are subject to Section 5, is unconstitutional, making Section 5 inoperable even
if technically still valid); see supra note 48.
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act in the Hands of a Conservative Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & POLICY 125, 129
(2010).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973; Shelby Transcript, supra note 74, at 21 (arguing that Section 4, the
coverage formula that determines which jurisdictions are subject to Section 5, did not treat states
equally).
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nondiscrimination, as did Section 5.87 Second, Section 2 claims are
filed after a discriminatory law has been enacted—and in local
federal district courts rather than with the Department of Justice or
with the D.C. District Court—so a state or local jurisdiction does not
need approval from Washington before it implements its own voting
laws.88 Finally, because Section 2 is a permanent provision of the
VRA needing no renewal,89 it does not invite the controversy that
accompanied each Section 5 reauthorization by Congress.90 Although
these characteristics make Section 2 less controversial than Section
5, some of them may make it less effective as well.
Arguably, Section 2 is a poor substitute for Section 5.91 Whereas
Section 5 is designed to block new legislation until a jurisdiction
proves that the changes would not diminish minority voting rights,
Section 2 allows new legislation to be implemented until a plaintiff
proves the law is discriminatory, and a court strikes it down.92
Therefore, relying on Section 2 to operate through the regular course
of litigation allows most discriminatory voting laws to take effect
unless a preliminary injunction is granted.93 Courts rarely enjoin
voting laws, however, because local district courts are reluctant to
interfere with elections without a full trial.94 Whereas Section 5
preclearance proceedings are relatively straightforward—requiring
only a showing that minorities would not be worse off with the new

87. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b–c.
88. See id.; id. § 1973c; Charlie Savage, Decision on Voting Law Could Limit Oversight,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2013, at A13.
89. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (expiring at the end of the twenty-five year period), with id.
§ 1973 (lacking a similar sunset provision).
90. For example, in 2006, although the Senate unanimously voted to reauthorize Section 5,
the Republican chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee filed a report almost a week later to
raise serious constitutional questions about the reauthorization. The Democratic members of the
committee, who were not shown the report before it was filed, dissented and contended the report
did not reflect the committee’s findings in support of reauthorization but instead provided
ammunition to challenge Section 5 in court. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the
New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 183–89 (2007); Rick Hasen, The Missing VRA Senate
Report, ELECTION L. BLOG (July 27, 2006, 9:08 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives
/006344.html; Rick Hasen, Senate VRA Committee Report Now Available, ELECTION L. BLOG
(Aug. 1, 2006, 11:22 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/006382.html.
91. E.g., Shelby Transcript, supra note 74, at 36–37 (statements of Justice Kennedy and
Solicitor General Verrilli); Hebert & Derfner, supra note 83.
92. Savage, supra note 88.
93. Hebert & Derfner, supra note 83.
94. Id.
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law95—Section 2 trials are protracted due to a multi-factor inquiry
that all but demands extensive discovery, several expert witnesses,
and multiple appeals to win a claim.96 As a result, Section 2 claims
commonly cost several million dollars to litigate,97 making some
discriminatory laws too costly for a private plaintiff to challenge,98
and thus allowing the discrimination to go unchecked.99
The multi-factor inquiry that makes Section 2 claims so
expensive comes from Thornburg v. Gingles,100 in which the Court
set out its test for Section 2 violations—generally claims of vote
dilution in redistricting. First, a plaintiff must show that a minority
group satisfies three preconditions:
(1) it is large and geographically compact enough to constitute a
majority in a single-member district;101
(2) it is politically cohesive;102 and
(3) its collective vote is submerged by the Caucasian majority
voting as a bloc.103
If any of these preconditions are not met, then Section 2 does
not require the court to grant relief.104 On the other hand, if all three
preconditions are met, then the court must determine by a totality of
the circumstances whether the minority group has the “ability to elect
its chosen representatives.”105 If not, the court would then mandate
the creation of a majority-minority district in which the minority

95. Savage, supra note 88; see Hebert & Derfner, supra note 83.
96. Hebert & Derfner, supra note 83.
97. Id.
98. Id. Pamela Karlan, Professor, Stanford Law Sch., Remarks at the Election Law in the
Roberts Court Panel at the George Washington University Law School Symposium: Law and
Democracy: A Symposium on Political Law (Nov. 16, 2012) at 1:04:42 [hereinafter Karlan
Symposium],
available
at
http://vimeo.com/user9108723/review/55785546/b29247c2fc
(responding to Rick Pildes’s assertion that the Texas redistricting plan could still be invalidated
by Section 2 of the VRA even if Section 5 becomes unavailable by pointing out that the Texas
Democrats might be able to afford to hire election law litigator Gerald Hebert, but local,
individual school board candidates probably would not).
99. Hebert & Derfner, supra note 83.
100. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
101. Id. at 50. As of 2009, a minority group must make up more than 50 percent of the
population of a district to satisfy this prong. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 12, 26 (2009).
102. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51.
103. Id.
104. J. GERALD HEBERT ET AL., THE REALIST’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING: AVOIDING THE
LEGAL PITFALLS 35 (2d ed. 2010).
105. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51; accord 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
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group would have the ability to elect its preferred candidates.106 This
“race-conscious districting”107—whether in the form of remedying
vote dilution under Section 5 or Section 2—has been criticized as a
form of “racial gerrymandering;”108 as “a sordid business” by Chief
Justice Roberts;109 and even, by Justice Scalia, as a “racial
entitlement.”110 This Article does not address the validity of this
Court-created remedy but instead focuses on the validity of the
provision itself that was created by Congress.111
1. Section 2 Before City of Mobile v. Bolden
In its original form, Section 2 provided: No voting qualification
or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be
imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color.112
Because its original text merely parroted the Fifteenth
Amendment,113 Section 2 was rarely used to litigate as the basis for
an independent claim; it was instead considered duplicative114 of
claims brought by minority voters under the Fifteenth Amendment
itself as well as under the Fourteenth Amendment.115

106. See HEBERT ET AL., supra note 104, at 36.
107. Abigail Thernstrom, Commentary on Shelby County v. Holder, SCOTUSBLOG
(Feb. 28, 2013, 5:46 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/commentary-on-shelby-county-vholder/#more-160299 (discussing the problems of creating majority-minority districts as a
remedy for voting discrimination).
108. Roger Clegg, Comments on the Oral Argument in Shelby County v. Holder,
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 28, 2013, 10:11 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/comments-onthe-oral-argument-in-shelby-county-v-holder/.
109. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
110. Shelby Transcript, supra note 74, at 46–47 (statement of Justice Scalia); see also Spencer
Overton, Justice Scalia’s Latest ‘Racial Entitlement’ Remark, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2013,
6:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/spencer-overton/justice-scalias-latest-ra_b_3103845
.html (“Even aside from improperly commenting on a pending case, Scalia is wrong” about
Section 5 of the VRA being a form of “racial entitlement.”).
111. See infra note 258 (discussing the difference between Section 2 and its remedy as set
forth in Gingles).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1970); Davidson, supra note 58, at 17.
113. ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, VOTING RIGHTS AND WRONGS: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIALLY FAIR ELECTIONS 81 (2009); Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 129.
114. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 129.
115. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 6–7 (2008).
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Originally, vote discrimination meant denying the right to vote
to minorities by preventing them from reaching the polls through the
use of tactics such as literacy tests and either physical violence or the
mere threat of it by “security” personnel carrying guns or torches.116
Over time, however, as racism became less overt, vote discrimination
took new forms, changing from outright denial to the abridgment of
the right to vote.117 Ballot access claims gave way to vote dilution
claims, usually alleging that legislatures had drawn districts in ways
that prevented minority groups from gaining votes sufficient to elect
representatives chosen by their own communities.118 Because
plaintiffs claiming vote dilution through complex redistricting
schemes had a harder time proving their allegations than those
alleging they had been physically barred from voting, Section 2
became even less useful as a viable claim.119
Because of the difficulty in proving a legislature’s subjective
intent to dilute minority votes “on account of race or color,” some
lower courts began inferring discriminatory intent using a totality-ofthe-circumstances analysis of more objectively verifiable factors.120
Such factors, known as the Zimmer factors, included histories of
official discrimination in a jurisdiction, majority vote requirements,
overt or subtle racial appeals, the exclusion of minorities from
candidate slating processes, and racial discrimination in education,
employment, and health.121 By finding discriminatory intent through
these kinds of indirect evidence, plus a showing of a discriminatory
effect, courts gained the ability to grant relief for Section 2 claims
more readily than for Fifteenth Amendment claims, which require
direct evidence of both discriminatory intent and effect.122 The
Supreme Court, however, put an abrupt stop to this practice in City of
Mobile v. Bolden.123

116. Davidson, supra note 58, at 15.
117. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 129–30.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1304–07 (5th Cir. 1973).
121. Id. at 1305.
122. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 57, at 735.
123. 446 U.S. 55 (1980), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
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2. The Gutting of Section 2 in City of Mobile v. Bolden
In 1980, a plurality of the Supreme Court in City of Mobile v.
Bolden held that a Section 2 violation required direct evidence of
both discriminatory intent124 and discriminatory effect, ending many
lower courts’ practice of inferring discriminatory intent through the
Zimmer factors’ totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.125 By
requiring a plaintiff to affirmatively prove intentional discrimination,
the fractured Court interpreted Section 2 exactly like the Fifteenth
Amendment, and this restrictive statutory interpretation essentially
gutted Section 2 as a viable claim in vote dilution cases.126
Having to prove a legislature’s intent to dilute minority voting
strength was a significant setback for plaintiffs.127 Because plaintiffs
challenged laws that had been in place for many years, exposing
discriminatory legislative intent meant discovery was prohibitively
burdensome.128 In fact, because the subjective intent to discriminate
had become mostly unspoken by the 1980s, especially in the halls of
government, discriminatory intent was almost impossible to prove.129
In addition, courts were loath to find vote dilution upon a showing of
purposeful discrimination because doing so forced them to
characterize elected officials as racists.130 Thus, granting relief for
Section 2 violations became so divisive that it threatened to
undermine any racial progress in a community.131 Very quickly, the
new intent requirement brought Section 2 claims to a “virtual
standstill”132 and compelled existing cases to be overturned and
dismissed.133
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 69–70.
See Davidson, supra note 58, at 38.
Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 130–31.
Davidson, supra note 58, at 38.
Id.
SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 621 (4th ed. 2012) (quoting Robert Kreuger, a former member of Congress
who testified at the congressional hearings for the 1982 amendments to the VRA).
130. See Memorandum from John Roberts to the Att’y Gen. 3 (Jan. 22, 1982) [hereinafter
Roberts, Jan. 22 Memo], available at http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-88
-0498/030-black-binder1/folder030.pdf#page=5.
131. Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and
Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 735 (1998) (quoting testimony of Arthur S.
Flemming, Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights).
132. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 129, at 621; Cox & Miles, supra note 115, at 6–7;
Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 130–31.
133. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 129, at 621 (quoting Armand Derfner).
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3. Section 2 After the Legislative Override of
City of Mobile v. Bolden
The resulting outcry of the civil rights community prompted
Congress to override Bolden with a 1982 amendment to the VRA
that affirmatively eliminated any intent requirement in Section 2 and
established a test for discriminatory effect only.134 Congress changed
the text of Section 2 from “to deny or abridge the right . . . to vote on
account of race or color”135 to “in a manner which results in a denial
or abridgment of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color.”136
From then on, relief could be granted for a violation of Section 2 by
showing the discriminatory effect of vote dilution alone, without any
direct proof of a legislature’s discriminatory purpose to cause it.137
This one change became the source of Section 2’s power as well as
its problems.138
The 1982 amendment to the VRA also changed Section 2 by
mandating a return to the pre-Bolden totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis, and the Senate Report supporting the amendment included a
list of factors to be analyzed that closely resembled the Zimmer
factors.139 In the end, the congressional override of the Court’s
holding in Bolden resurrected Section 2 as a viable enforcement arm
of the VRA for the next three decades.140
If the Court eviscerates Section 2 again, however, a
congressional override may not be forthcoming to save it. If, for
example, the Perrymander’s Section 2 challenge reaches the
Supreme Court on appeal, the Court may again interpret Section 2 in
a way that makes Section 2 essentially unenforceable. This time,
however, the ongoing legislative gridlock may prevent Congress
from overriding the ruling.141 Without a congressional override, the
Court’s statutory interpretation would prevail, and Section 2 claims
134. Davidson, supra note 58, at 38–40.
135. Id. at 17.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
137. See id.
138. See discussion infra Parts III.B, IV.
139. Davidson, supra note 58, at 38–40.
140. See Binny Miller, Who Shall Rule and Govern? Local Legislative Delegations, Racial
Politics, and the Voting Rights Act, 102 YALE L.J. 105, 108 (1992); see also Samuel Issacharoff,
Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1845–47 (1992) (discussing the 1982 amendment).
141. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
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may once again grind to a halt.142 If that happens, enforcement of the
VRA would fundamentally cease.143 Congressional gridlock,
therefore, poses a real threat to the survival of Section 2, and thus,
the VRA.
III. CONGRESSIONAL GRIDLOCK AND POLARIZATION
“You show me a nation without partisanship, and I’ll
show you a tyranny.”
—Tom DeLay, Farewell Address to U.S. House of
Representatives, June 12, 2006,144 prior to his conviction
for money laundering in connection with his 2003 partisan
gerrymander in Texas145
Congressional gridlock stems from the political polarization of
Congress.146 Polarization occurs at both ends of the legislative
process: it affects and is affected by redistricting because polarized
legislatures gerrymander district lines to reinforce partisanship in
election results.147 Though the VRA does not explicitly encompass
claims of partisan gerrymandering, it is one of the few means
available to control it.148 A retrenchment in the VRA’s enforcement,
therefore, would likely result in increased partisan gerrymandering149
142. See infra Part II.2.
143. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 129, at 621. Although Section 3 might still exist, it has
historically been interpreted as a remedial claim brought as part of Section 2 litigation. See
Michael Li, Q&A on the New Section 3 Claim About Texas Redistricting, TEX. REDISTRICTING &
ELECTION LAW (July 3, 2013, 8:06 PM), http://txredistricting.org/post/54556057254/q-a-on-thenew-section-3-claim-about-texas. Without Section 2, then, Section 3 may also become
inoperable, leaving the VRA without an enforcement mechanism.
144. BICKERSTAFF, supra note 2, at 389.
145. Tom DeLay Convicted of Money Laundering, FOX NEWS (Nov. 24, 2010, 9:46 AM),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/11/24/jury-convicts-delay-money-laundering-trial. But see
Texas Appeals Court Reverses Tom DeLay's 2010 Conviction, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324492604579085102718299452.html.
146. John Harwood, Deep Philosophical Divide Underlies the Impasse, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/02/us/politics/a-peek-under-the-hood-of-sequestration
-politics.html?_r=0; Nate Silver, As Swing Districts Dwindle, Can a Divided House Stand?, N.Y.
TIMES: FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 27, 2012, 9:46 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com
/2012/12/27/as-swing-districts-dwindle-can-a-divided-house-stand.
147. Telephone Interview with Jessica Levinson, Assoc. Clinical Professor, Loyola Law Sch.,
Los Angeles (Feb. 24, 2013).
148. Bazelon, supra note 54; Gerken, supra note 54; see Part III.B. infra.
149. Bazelon, supra note 54; Richard L. Hasen, If the Court Strikes Down Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, REUTERS: GREAT DEBATE (Jan. 30, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/great
-debate/2013/01/30/if-the-court-strikes-section-5-of-voting-rights-act.
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and, in turn, even more congressional polarization and gridlock.150
But the relationship is symbiotic: Congress’s polarization may also
end up allowing a retrenchment in the enforcement of the VRA to
prevent a legislative override, should one become necessary.
A. The Polarization of Congress
Congress is more politically polarized now than at any time
since Reconstruction.151 Both Democrats and Republicans have
moved so far to the extremes that finding common ground between
them is almost unheard of.152 Because virtually no moderates remain
in Congress to bridge the gulf between these extremes,153 bipartisan
agreements are rarely reached, and when they are, it is only through a
hard-fought, protracted struggle.154 This current dysfunction stands
in stark contrast to the relative ease with which Congress put
together bipartisan agreements during the Reagan era, when about
half of the members of Congress were considered moderates.155
Conservative and moderate Democrats who lubricated the wheels of
Congress in the past were often called Scoop Jackson Democrats
during the Cold War and Boll Weevil Democrats in the Reagan era,
but their most recent incarnations, the Blue Dog and Third Way
Democrats,156 are dwindling in number.157 The Blue Dogs, for
example, have gone from being a powerful coalition of fifty-four
moderate congressional Democrats in 2010 to only fourteen

150. Silver, supra note 146.
151. Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, The Polarization of the Congressional Parties,
VOTEVIEW.COM, http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp (last updated Jan. 18, 2013); see
Hasen, supra note 53, at 234; Keith T. Poole, Graphic Picture of a Polarized Congress, 41 UGA
RES. 32, 32–33 (2012), available at http://issuu.com/ugaresearch/docs/ugaresearch_sp12.
152. Poole, supra note 151, at 33.
153. Gerald G. Seib, Centrist Democrats Hold Possible Cure, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323699704578326142187948904; Devin
McCarthy, The 2012 Elections and the Vanishing Congressional Moderate, FAIRVOTE.ORG
(Nov. 15, 2012),
http://www.fairvote.org/the-2012-elections-and-the-vanishing-congressional
-moderate#.UPJlhOjrmBD.
154. Seib, supra note 153; McCarthy, supra note 153.
155. Poole, RESEARCH, supra note 151, at 33.
156. Seib, supra note 153.
157. Molly Ball, The New, Progressive Congress, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 16, 2012,
10:13 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/11/the-new-progressive-congress
/265329 (noting the replacement of moderate Democrats with “real” progressives).
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members remaining in office after the 2012 elections.158 Liberal
Republicans also helped Congress function more smoothly in the
past, but there are almost none left to count.159 Congressional
centrists from both sides of the aisle, who are more pragmatic rather
than strictly defined by party ideology, are nearly extinct,160 or at
least in hiding.161 As a result, floor votes are carried out largely along
party lines, and because Republicans control the House and
Democrats (arguably) control the Senate,162 dysfunction prevails.
The current 113th Congress comprises the lowest number of
moderates ever,163 which puts it on track to be the most dysfunctional
Congress ever.164 Congress’s inability to pass bipartisan legislation
may put Section 2 in jeopardy at the hands of the Supreme Court.165

158. Id.; Nate Silver, In House of Representatives, an Arithmetic Problem, N.Y. TIMES:
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Dec. 21, 2012,
9:50 PM),
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com
/2012/12/21/in-house-of-representatives-an-arithmetic-problem.
159. Seib, supra note 153.
160. Id.
161. See Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., Poison Pill Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/02/opinion/blow-the-sequester-poison-pill-politics.html.
162. Democrats have made up a simple majority in the Senate since 2007, Party Division in
the Senate, 1789–Present, UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history
/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2014), but arguably do not “control” it.
See infra Part III.A.1.b.
163. See Poole, supra note 151, at 33; Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, House 1879–
2012 Percentage of Moderates (-0.25 to 0.25 in the Parties on Liberal-Conservative Dimension),
Graph in The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW.COM, http://
voteview.com/political_polarization.asp (last updated Jan. 18, 2013); see also Silver, supra note
146 (discussing the sharp polarization of Congressional districts in 2012). If Congress was at its
most polarized in the spring of 2012, when Mr. Poole’s research was last updated, it most likely
still holds true after the 2012 election ushered in even more political polarization. Doyle
McManus, Op-Ed., The Worst Job in Congress, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013,
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-mcmanus-column-boehner-20130106
,0,679523.column (noting that the Republican majority in the House is both smaller and more
conservative than it was before the 2012 election because most of the Republicans who left were
moderates).
164. Poole, supra note 151, at 33 (“Given that trends in polarization have continued unabated
for decades[,] . . . it is unlikely that this deadlock will be broken anytime soon.”); Silver, supra
note 146 (“As partisanship continues to increase, a divided government may increasingly mean a
dysfunctional one.”). But see John Hudak, The Fiscal Cliff Deal: The Benefits of Politics as
Usual, THE BROOKINGS INST.: UP FRONT (Jan. 7, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.brookings.edu
/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/01/07-fiscal-cliff-politics-hudak (explaining that Republicans no
longer have a reason to promote gridlock after Obama was reelected, and that the bipartisan fiscal
cliff deal that transpired shortly thereafter should not be seen as an anomaly but instead, perhaps,
as the beginning of an encouraging trend).
165. See infra Parts IV, V.
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1. A Cause of Congressional Polarization: Partisan Gerrymandering
One cause for the disappearance of congressional moderates is
partisan gerrymandering, which the Supreme Court characterized as
“the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and
populations for partisan or personal political purposes.”166 The
tradition of gerrymandering is not new to the redistricting process; it
has been called “as American as apple pie or, perhaps more
precisely, as American as slicing an apple pie in such a way as to
feed your friends and family while starving your enemies.”167 As
such, partisan gerrymandering is widely considered to be a cause of
political polarization, though some social scientists debate the extent
of its influence.168
a. How partisan gerrymandering helps polarize the House of
Representatives
In the “political blood sport”169 of legislative redistricting, the
party in control of the state legislature draws Congressional districts
that are less competitive and more politically homogeneous, ensuring
166. Kirkpatrick v. Priesler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring).
167. Jamin B. Raskin, Nonrepresentational Line-Drawing and the Universal Representational
Imperative: Why Judges Should Replace Gerrymandering with Proportional Representation, 30
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 51, 52 (2012), http://ylpr.yale.edu/inter_alia
/nonrepresentational-line-drawing-and-universal-representational-imperative-why-judges.
168. Jamie L. Carson et al., Redistricting and Party Polarization in the U.S. House of
Representatives, 35 AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH 878, 899–900 (2007) (explaining that
redistricting’s impact on polarization contributes to a polarization that already exists within the
electorate); Rob Richie & Devin McCarthy, The House GOP Can’t Be Beat: It’s Worse Than
Gerrymandering, SALON (Jan. 13, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/01/13/the_house
_gop_cant_be_beat_its_worse_than_gerrymandering. In addition to partisan gerrymandering,
“unintentional gerrymandering” also gives Republicans a structural advantage. Democrats often
choose to live in dense urban areas, essentially packing themselves into supermajority districts
with more than the necessary number of Democratic votes to win a seat, thus “wasting” some
votes. See JAMES A. THOMSON, A HOUSE DIVIDED: POLARIZATION AND ITS EFFECT ON RAND 17
(Rand Corp. 2010), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers
/2010/RAND_OP291.pdf; Griff Palmer & Michael Cooper, How Maps Helped Republicans Keep
an Edge in the House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/us
/politics/redistricting-helped-republicans-hold-onto-congress.html; Nicholas Goedert, Not
Gerrymandering but Districting: More Evidence on How Democrats Won the Popular Vote but
Lost the Congress, THEMONKEYCAGE (Nov. 15, 2012), http://themonkeycage.org/blog/2012/11
/15/not-gerrymandering-but-districting-more-evidence-on-how-democrats-won -the-popular-votebut-lost-the-congress.
169. Jessica Levinson, The Political Blood Sport Known as Redistricting Comes to L.A.,
KCET (Jan. 26, 2012, 10:03 AM), http://www.kcet.org/news/1st_and_spring/commentary/the
-political-blood-sport-known-as-redistricting-comes-to-los-angeles.html.
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that its own candidates will win and that their party will control those
seats in the House of Representatives.170 Because representatives
from gerrymandered districts know that they only need to please the
constituents in their own party to be reelected, they are less likely to
compromise in Washington.171 In fact, incumbents from “safe”
districts are more likely to lose party primaries to challengers in their
own party than to lose the general election to opponents from another
party.172 Because the general election’s outcome is preordained by
redistricting, the primary has become the true election, creating “a
race to the extremes.”173 Thus, the winners arrive in Washington
beholden to the outer fringes of the party, giving them even less
reason to vote as centrists or to cooperate with the opposing party in
Congress.174 Bipartisanship has cost representatives their seats in
reelection bids,175 and the parties themselves tolerate less ideological
diversity within their ranks than they have in the past.176 Even
moderate legislators who have not been “primaried” are replaced
upon retirement by successors catering to the political extremes.177
The result is a scarcity of moderates who can bridge the ever-

170. See Carson et al., supra note 168; Palmer & Cooper, supra note 168.
171. Palmer & Cooper, supra note 168; Aaron Blake, How Redistricting Leads to a More
Partisan Congress—in Two Charts, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Oct. 16, 2012, 3:29 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2012/10/16/how-redistricting-leads-to-a-more
-polarized-congress-in-two-charts.
172. See Robert Draper, The League of Dangerous Mapmakers, THE ATLANTIC
(Sep. 19, 2012, 8:56 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-league-of
/309084/.
173. Id.
174. See Blake, supra note 171.
175. See Ball, supra note 157. Even John Boehner’s bipartisanship actions have endangered
his position as Speaker of the House. Tamara Keith, The Boehner Rule, NPR: IT’S ALL POLITICS
(Mar. 6, 2013, 3:45 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/03/06/173533398/the
-boehner-rule-speaker-bucks-house-gop-for-some-legislation; see GOP Trying to Chart a Way
Forward, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 5, 2013, http://www.chron.com/default/article/GOP-trying-to-chart
-way-forward-4170064.php; Ball, supra note 157; Elspeth Reeve, The Secret iPad List to Bring
Down Boehner, THE ATLANTIC WIRE (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics
/2013/01/secret-ipad-list-bring-down-boehner/60592.
176. Nate Silver, Party-Line Voting Makes Scott Brown Part of a Dying Breed in the Senate,
N.Y. TIMES: FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 4, 2013, 8:08 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com
/2013/02/04/party-line-voting-makes-scott-brown-part-of-a-dying-breed-in-the-senate.
177. THOMSON, supra note 168, at 16; Jeff Zeleny & Jonathan Weisman, As Republicans
Debate Future Direction, One Senator Decides He Will Step Aside, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/us/politics/as-republicans-debate-future-direction-one
-senator-steps-aside.html.
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widening gulf between two opposing ideologies, thus reinforcing the
chronic political polarization in the House.178
b. Polarization in the Senate
The Senate also suffers from polarization.179 Though senators
are elected statewide instead of by district and are thus not prone to
partisan gerrymandering like their counterparts in the House,180 the
Senate is nevertheless just as gridlocked.181 As in the House, Senate
votes tend to be in lockstep along party lines, and moderates needed
for bipartisan agreements are few.182 Although Democrats currently
hold a majority in the Senate, they do not have a supermajority of
sixty votes necessary to overcome a filibuster,183 which is the “new
normal” for almost any vote to succeed.184 In recent years,
Republicans have filibustered185 to block the nomination of a defense
secretary for the first time186 and to block even purely procedural
measures as a matter of course.187 In fact, more presidential
nominations have been filibustered under President Obama than

178. See Harwood, supra note 146 (“Over the last generation, polarization has melted away
the alloy that once narrowed differences between Republicans and Democrats, leaving both as
masses of near-pure ideological ore.”); see also David Weigel, Your Congress, Now With Helpful
Color Coding!, SLATE.COM (Sept. 5, 2013, 7:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
_and_politics/politics/2013/09/almanac_of_american_politics_a_biennial_reference_book
_explains_why_we_re.html (explaining that “the gerrymanders of 2010 have taken most of the
country out of play” and that the gerrymander was possible because voters no longer split their
tickets or vote for candidates with views that buck the party line).
179. Jonathan Weisman, The Senate’s Long Slide to Gridlock, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/us/politics/new-senates-first-task-will-likely-be-trying-to
-fix-itself.html .
180. See Carson et al., supra note 168, at 883.
181. Weisman, supra note 179; Poole, supra note 151, at 33.
182. See Silver, supra note 176; Explore the Senate, THE U.S. CONGRESS VOTES DATABASE,
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/congress/110/senate/members/# (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
183. See Weisman, supra note 179. Although the Senate rules now require only a simple
majority to confirm presidential appointments (except Supreme Court Justice nominees), the rules
still require a supermajority to pass legislation. Michael Memoli & Lisa Mascaro, Senate
Democrats Invoke ‘Nuclear Option’ on Filibusters, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2013,
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-senate-filibuster-20131122,0,7284880.story.
184. Hasen, supra note 53, at 206.
185. Memoli & Mascaro, supra note 183.
186. Jackie Calmes, White House Concerned About Delay in Security Confirmations, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/us/politics/mcdonough-expresses
-concern-on-delay-in-hagel-and-brennan-confirmations.html.
187. Weisman, supra note 179.
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under all previous presidents combined.188 Nevertheless, the “nuclear
option” that Democrats invoked to lower the number of votes
required to confirm most presidential nominations without threat of a
filibuster only escalates the procedural warfare within the Senate.189
That landmark vote to change a century-old rule shows the extent of
the Senate’s current dysfunction190 and merely invites Republicans to
use other procedures to achieve their own aims.191 Thus the Senate’s
long-storied tradition of collegiality192 is sinking into the same
“partisan mud”193 that is miring the House in gridlock.

188. Louis Jacobson, Harry Reid Says Eighty-two Presidential Nominees Have Been Blocked
Under President Obama, Eighty-six Blocked Under All the Other Presidents, POLITIFACT.COM,
Nov. 21, 2013, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2013/nov/22/harry-reid/harry
-reid-says-82-presidential-nominees-have-been (pointing out that the figures actually represent
the number of cloture attempts made, not nominees blocked, meaning Senator Reid’s point is
actually stronger because more nominees have been blocked since President Obama took office
than before that date). A cloture motion, which requires sixty votes to pass, stops a filibuster and
allows the Senate to proceed to a final vote. Id.; see also Russell Wheeler, The Torturous,
Protracted Wait to Confirm Judges—From Abe to Obama, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2013), http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/02/the-tortuous-protracted-wait-to-confirm-judges
-from-abe-to-obama/273485 (“[A]dvice and consent has become obstruction and delay.”).
189. Memoli & Mascaro, supra note 183. The rule change will not apply to passing
legislation or confirming Supreme Court Justices, which will continue to be subject to a sixtyvote threshold to overcome a filibuster. Though it may be easier to confirm most presidential
nominees in the immediate future, other orders of business are expected to be far more difficult
due to a “toxic atmosphere” that now pervades the Senate because of the rule change. Id.
190. Id.; Ashley Parker & Jonathan Weisman, Holiday Finds Congress Well Short of Goals,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/filibuster-vote-justtip-of-dysfunction-iceberg.html (citing a “daunting” list of bills, from a tax code overhaul to
immigration reform, that have stalled in Congress due to deep-seated distrust between the
parties).
191. Charlie Savage, Despite Filibuster Limits, a Door Remains Open to Block Judge
Nominees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/29/us/politics/despitefilibuster-limits-a-door-remains-open-to-block-judge-nominees.html (explaining the blue slip
tradition giving Senators “a silent, unaccountable veto” of federal judges nominated to the bench
within a Senator’s state).
192. See id.; Chris Cillizza, Senate Has Become More Partisan, Less Collegial—More Like
the House, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-has
-become-more-partisan-less-collegialmore-like-the-house/2013/04/07/611756de-9f92-11e2-82bc511538ae90a4_story.html?tid=pm_politics_pop.
193. Damian Paletta & Janet Hook, Cuts Roll In as Time Runs Out, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1,
2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323478304578332543799317924;
Poole, supra note 151, at 33.
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2. The Effect of Polarized Gridlock
The effects of congressional gridlock are not merely theoretical
but have had a serious impact on the daily lives of Americans.194 As
a result, Congress’s approval rating hit an all-time low in 2014,195
ranking lower than the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), President
Nixon during the Watergate scandal, and lawyers.196 The 112th
Congress was the least productive ever recorded,197 having passed
the lowest number of laws since Congress started keeping track,198
with most of those laws merely housekeeping measures, such as
naming post offices.199 The public’s overwhelming disapproval was
largely due to Congress’s partisan bickering,200 which is not new on
Capitol Hill, although the gridlock for which Congress is now reviled
is unprecedented.201
194. See Richard Simon, Government Shutdown Hits Fisherman, Farmers, Physicists, L.A.
TIMES,
Oct. 11, 2013,
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-shutdown-impacts-20131012,0
,1327984.story.
195. Public Faith in Congress Falls Again, Hits Historic Low, GALLUP, INC. (June 19, 2014),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/171710/public-faith-congress-falls-again-hits-historic-low.aspx
(“America’s current confidence in Congress is not only the lowest on record, but also the lowest
Gallup has recorded for any institution in the 41-year trend.”).
196. Colorado Senator Michael Bennet presented a chart entitled The Popularity of Congress
Today on the Senate floor, showing approval ratings for the IRS at 40 percent (Gallup 2009),
Nixon during Watergate at 24 percent (Gallup 1974), lawyers at 29 percent (Gallup 2011), and
Congress at 9 percent (New York Times / CBS 2011). U.S. Senator Michael Bennet, Congress
Hits Rock Bottom, YOUTUBE (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=awXdkKgF3Qw; Chris Cillizza, Congress’s Approval Problem in One Chart, WASH. POST: THE
FIX (Nov. 15, 2011, 12:09 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/congressapproval-problem-in-onechart/2011/11/15/gIQAkHmtON_blog.html.
197. Chuck Todd et al., First Thoughts: Farewell to the 112th Congress, NBC NEWS
(Dec. 31, 2012,
8:42 AM),
http://firstread.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/12/31/16266493-firstthoughts-farewell-to-the-112th-congress?lite; see also Steven Rattner, America in 2012, as Told
in Charts, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Dec. 31, 2012, 7:43 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes
.com/2012/12/31/america-in-2012-as-told-in-charts (“That Congress has ceased to function
effectively has become an article of faith for most Americans. But the extent of the gridlock on
Capitol Hill may not be fully appreciated. Over its two-year life span, the 112th Congress that just
adjourned passed just 200 laws, 31 percent of the average of the 32 Congresses preceding it.”).
198. Todd et al., supra note 197.
199. Id.
200. Allison Kopicki, Approval of Congress Matches Record Low, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS
(Sept. 16, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/approval-of-congressmatches-record-low/.
201. Poole, supra note 151, at 32–33. But see Conor Friedersdorf, The Do-Nothing Congress
of 1880 as Described at the Time, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2013, 7:15 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/03/the-do-nothing-congress-of-1880-as
-described-at-the-time/273459/ (citing a June 20, 1880, issue of The Republic that suggests
Congress might have been just as unproductive and disrespected at that time).
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a. Tangible effects of congressional gridlock
Perhaps the most profound effects of congressional gridlock
result from the ongoing battle over fiscal matters.202 Senator Joe
Manchin III of West Virginia put it succinctly: “Something has gone
terribly wrong when the biggest threat to our American economy is
the American Congress.”203 The debt-ceiling standoff of 2011, for
example, helped provoke the Standard & Poor’s downgrade of U.S.
Treasury debt,204 costing taxpayers an estimated $18.9 billion in
additional interest payments205 and triggering a stock market
slump.206 Yet, in the sequester stalemate of 2013, budget
compromises with bipartisan support were actually abandoned in
favor of political posturing,207 and neither party put forth a credible
effort to avert208 the automatic cuts that may cost Americans an
estimated 900,000 jobs within a year.209 The federal government’s

202. See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Jackie Calmes, Lawmakers Gird for Next Fiscal Clash, on
the Debt Ceiling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/us/politics/for
-obama-no-clear-path-to-avoid-a-debt-ceiling-fight.html (quoting Mark Zandi, the chief
economist at Moody’s Analytics, in regard to looming partisan battles over the national debt:
“We’re in for another round of brinksmanship and uncertainty . . . I don’t think the economy can
really find its footing and jump to a higher level of growth until we get to the other side of this.”).
203. Peter Coy, The Fiscal Cliff Deal and the Damage Done, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Jan. 2, 2013),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-01-02/the-fiscal-cliff-deal-and-the
-damage-done#p3 (quoting Senator Joe Manchin III).
204. United States of America Long-Term Rating Lowered to ‘AA+’ Due to Political Risks,
Rising Debt Burden; Outlook Negative, STANDARD & POOR’S (Aug. 5, 2011, 8:13 PM), http://
www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetID=1245316529563 (“The political
brinksmanship of recent months highlights what we see as America’s governance and
policymaking becoming less stable, less effective, and less predictable than what we previously
believed.”).
205. Binyamin Appelbaum, Debt Ceiling Doubt and Its Costs, N.Y. TIMES: DEBT
RECKONING (Jan. 2, 2013, 5:52 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/us/politics/debt
-reckoning.html#sha=97881b346; see Todd et al., supra note 197.
206. Annie Lowrey, Obama and Republicans Gear Up for Next Fiscal Fight, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/us/politics/obama-and-gop-gear-up-for-nextfiscal-fight.html; see Mary Williams Walsh, Credit Ratings Services Give Mixed Reviews to Tax
Deal, Debt Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013, 3:42 PM), http://projects.nytimes.com/livedashboard/mobile/debt-reckoning.
207. See Paletta & Hook, supra note 193; Jonathan Weisman, Senate Shoots Down
Competing Bills on Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/01
/us/politics/senate-shoots-down-competing-bills-to-undo-cuts.html.
208. William Kristol, A Darkling Plain, THE WKLY. STANDARD (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/darkling-plain_703140.html.
209. Andy Sullivan, Insight: Largely Out of Sight, U.S. Budget Sequester Still Cuts Deep,
REUTERS, Sept. 28, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/28/us-usa-budget
-sequester-insight-idUSBRE98R05K20130928. Some of the cuts affect public defenders, who are
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sixteen-day shutdown in October 2013 cost the U.S. economy an
estimated $2.4 billion210 when, among other consequences,
fishermen could not obtain permits to catch Alaskan king crab,
tourists canceled vacations to national parks, and scientists put their
research on hold.211 Thus, Congress’s “reflexive polarization”212
results in severe, tangible repercussions felt by ordinary Americans.
b. An intangible effect of congressional gridlock
But one effect of congressional gridlock may have flown under
the radar of most Americans, even though it may have more lasting
consequences than Congress’s current fiscal clashes. Because of its
functional inability to pass legislation, Congress has basically ceded
power over the final interpretation of federal statutes to the Supreme
Court.213 After all, a gridlocked Congress can no longer participate in
its normal dialogue of statutory interpretation with the Supreme
Court. Ordinarily, Congress writes a statute, the Court interprets it,
and Congress rewrites the statute if it disagrees with the Court’s
interpretation.214 This dialogue was what saved Section 2; it allowed
Congress to respond to the Court’s holding in City of Mobile v.
Bolden215 by passing the 1982 amendment to the VRA.216 If the
Court were to gut Section 2 again, however—which may be likely as
discussed in Parts IV and V below—a now-gridlocked Congress may
not be able to muster enough agreement among its polarized
furloughed for twenty days per year and, ironically, must be replaced with higher-priced privatesector lawyers to defend poor defendants. Id.
210. Annie Lowrey, Nathaniel Popper & Nelson D. Schwartz, Gridlock Has Cost U.S.
Billions, and the Meter Is Still Running, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com
/2013/10/17/business/economy/high-cost-to-the-economy-from-the-fiscal-impasse.html
(citing
Standard & Poor’s estimate of the cost of the shutdown in terms of inflation-adjusted gross
domestic product).
211. Simon, supra note 194. The shutdown was spurred by a faction of the Republican Party
that threatened to let the U.S. government default on its debt payments unless Congress defunded
the Affordable Care Act, otherwise known as Obamacare. Gerald F. Seib, Was the Point
Republicans Made in the Shutdown Worth the Price?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304384104579139961910774786.
212. Joe Scarborough, Op-Ed., Singing the Sequester Soap Opera, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/02/opinion/how-obama-overplayed-his-hand-on-the-sequester
.html.
213. Hasen, supra note 53, at 209–10, 226–27.
214. Id. at 209–10.
215. 446 U.S. 55 (1980), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
216. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 130–31; see supra Part II.
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members to rewrite the statute. If Congress cannot, then the Supreme
Court would have the final word on the statutory interpretation of
Section 2,217 which, like Bolden did until its 1982 amendment, may
put an end to Section 2 as a practical matter.218 Like the more
obvious economic effects of congressional gridlock, this
repercussion is not just theoretical. Congress has become so
gridlocked that the Court has had final say on statutory interpretation
almost as often in recent years as it has on constitutional
interpretation.219
In fact, congressional gridlock already has incapacitated Section
5 of the VRA by preventing Congress from heeding the Court’s
warning, in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One
v. Holder (NAMUDNO),220 to revise the provision.221 Although Chief
Justice Roberts, in an opinion joined by seven other Justices,
addressed the constitutional weaknesses of Section 5 in dicta, the
Court ruled instead on statutory grounds, arguably to allow Congress
the chance to address those weaknesses.222 Because Congress failed
to revise the VRA accordingly, the Court eventually gutted Section 5
in 2013.223 Because many members of the Senate and the House
represent jurisdictions formerly covered by Section 5 and even

217. By contrast, however, partisan overrides—ones that do not need bipartisan support—
may still be possible, but are still improbable unless both houses of Congress and the Presidency
are controlled by the same party. Hasen, supra note 53, at 238.
218. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 130–31.
219. Hasen, supra note 53, at 209. Though the Supreme Court may not have intended to
arrogate this power of statutory interpretation, it is apparently well aware of it. For example,
during oral arguments for National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012), Justice Scalia made it clear that if the Court severed a provision of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, commonly known as Obamacare, its ruling would decide the
law’s final form because Congress would almost certainly not be able to agree on a revision to the
severed provision. Transcript of Oral Argument at 73, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-393). Justice Scalia explained to the Petitioners’ attorney Paul
Clement, “You can’t repeal the rest of the Act because you’re not going to get sixty votes in the
Senate to repeal the rest of it.” Id. Thus, the Court recognized the expanded power it wields
because Congress cannot act when gridlocked. See Hasen, supra note 53, at 206–07.
220. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
221. Id. at 202–05; Hasen, supra note 53, at 227–28 (citing NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 229).
222. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 202–05; see Guy-Uriel Charles, Race, Redistricting, and
Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1185, 1187 (2007).
223. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (holding Section 5’s trigger
provision, Section 4, unconstitutional for no longer being “justified by current needs” and for not
abiding by a principle of “equal sovereignty” among states, thus making Section 5 inoperable);
see supra note 48.
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supported its demise,224 Congress is unlikely to be able to resuscitate
the provision in any form225 for the foreseeable future.226 Thus, the
Court’s evisceration of Section 5 may be final.227 As a result, the
ability to bring a claim under the VRA now falls largely to Section 2.
B. Section 2 Combats Polarization by Constraining Partisan
Gerrymandering
Though Section 2 may be at risk due to the polarization of
Congress, Section 2 is paradoxically one of the few ways to combat
polarization. As one of the only means to constrain partisan
gerrymandering,228 Section 2 helps to stem gerrymandering’s
widespread effects, including congressional polarization. In fact,
Section 2 can be more successful in this endeavor than a partisan
gerrymandering claim itself.
1. Partisan Gerrymandering: An Essentially Unenforceable Claim
The widespread growth of partisan gerrymandering in the last
twenty-eight years may be largely attributed to the Supreme Court’s
unwillingness to find even egregiously drawn districts

224. Paul West, Republican Party Increasingly a Matter of Region, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2013,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-gop-analysis-20130106,0,787706.story
(“To an unprecedented degree, today’s Republican majority in the House is centered in the states
of the old Confederacy . . . [T]he South’s dominance and internal politics have reinforced the tilt
[of House Republicans] toward sharply conservative views.”).
225. See Richard Hasen, Online VRA Symposium: The Voting Rights Act, Congressional
Silence, and the Political Polarization, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 10, 2012, 11:45 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-vra-symposium-the-voting-rights-act-congressional
-silence-and-the-political-polarization/.
226. Rick Hasen, The Chances of a Deal to Fix the VRA After Shelby County? Observations
About the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, ELECTION LAW BLOG (July 17, 2013, 12:34
PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=53094 (“Today’s hearing showed how far apart Democrats
and Republicans are.”); Alexei Koseff, Former Voting Rights Act Provision Gets Hearing in
Senate, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/17/nation/la-na-voting
-rights-20130718 (“A Senate Judiciary Committee hearing reveals a partisan split over how to
respond to the Supreme Court’s recent ruling striking down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act.”).
227. In 1965, Congress willingly gave up some of its policy-making power to the Court by
writing the broadest possible statute, entrusting the Court to promote, not hinder, the aims of the
VRA. The Court, for its part, interpreted the VRA broadly, trusting that Congress would not
override its interpretations of the statute. However, this “constitutional partnership” to further
voting rights policy, which lasted for decades after the enactment of the VRA, no longer exists.
See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 150–52.
228. Bazelon, Gerrymandering, supra note 54.
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unconstitutional when motivated solely by party politics.229 Although
the Court held in Davis v. Bandemer230 that partisan gerrymandering
claims are justiciable, a plurality of the Court set forth a standard for
unconstitutionality that has never been met in almost three decades
since the Court’s ruling.231 The absence of a clear, majority-approved
standard for just how much partisan redistricting rises to the level of
unconstitutionality has given legislators since 1986 a “constitutional
green light”232 to gerrymander at will.233
With no limits set for politically motivated redistricting,
legislators face few constraints in drawing district maps.234 Basically,
as long as legislators draw the district lines in the pursuit of their
own political interests, the plan will survive constitutional scrutiny as
a partisan gerrymander.235 As an equal protection claim, a partisan
gerrymandering action must be brought by voters who have suffered
discrimination based on their political affiliation.236 Political parties,
however, are not a protected class under the Fourteenth
Amendment,237 and political affiliation is not an immutable

229. Id. (quoting Nathaniel Persily: “[I]f the facts in those two cases weren’t egregious
enough, it’s hard to see a set of facts that would be, from the Court’s point of view.”). Professor
Persily is referring to Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), and League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
230. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
231. At the Supreme Court level, the standard for unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering is
stated as “[the] continued frustration of the will of the majority of the voters or effective denial to
a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process.” Id. at 133 (White, J.,
plurality opinion on the merits). Justice White also wrote for the majority in Bandemer that a
partisan gerrymandering claim brought under the Equal Protection Clause is justiciable. Id. at
143.
232. Id. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
233. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 474 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (three-judge
panel) (quoting Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))
(internal quotation marks omitted) (“It is now painfully clear that Justice Powell's concern that the
decision offered a constitutional green light to would-be gerrymanderers has been realized.”),
vacated sub nom. Travis Cnty., Tex. v. Perry, 543 U.S. 941 (2004).
234. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 173 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
235. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 637
(2002).
236. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127 (majority opinion).
237. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S 267, 288 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (“[The Constitution]
guarantees equal protection of the law to persons, not equal representation in government to
equivalently sized groups.”); Laughlin McDonald, The Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed
Judicially Manageable Standard and Other Reform Options for Partisan Gerrymandering, 46
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 246 (2009) (“There is nothing in the federal Constitution that expressly
prohibits gerrymandering.”).
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characteristic like race238 because it may change from election to
election, or even within the same election.239 To draw redistricting
plans, therefore, legislators just have to ensure that “impermissible
motivations are accompanied by permissible ones.”240 Because the
constitutional standard for measuring partisan discrimination is
unclear, and because the Court considers partisanship a permissible
motivation for drawing district lines, partisan gerrymandering has
proliferated largely unabated since Bandemer.241
2. Section 2’s Constraint on Partisan Gerrymandering
The motivation behind a redistricting plan plays no role in the
Section 2 effects test, so some partisan gerrymanders run afoul of the
VRA regardless of the legislature’s purported intent.242 The mere
effect of diluting minority voting strength, whether for political
power or racial animus, violates Section 2, which enables the VRA
to check political overreaching when a partisan gerrymandering
claim cannot.243 As long as a minority group tends to side with a
particular party, as Latinos currently do with Democrats, for
example, the VRA can effectively curtail partisan gerrymandering
when a redistricting plan has the effect of discriminating against that
minority group.244 In Tom DeLay’s redistricting plan, for example,
Texas’s District 23, drawn specifically to exclude certain Latino
voters, did not violate the Court’s standard for an unconstitutional
partisan gerrymander, but it did violate Section 2 of the VRA for
238. Vieth, 541 U.S at 287.
239. Id.
240. Dan Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (1989).
241. In 2004, Justice Scalia, writing for a plurality in Vieth, argued that the total absence of
successful claims meant that partisan gerrymandering must be non-justiciable for lack of
judicially manageable standards. Vieth, 541 U.S at 287 (plurality opinion). Nevertheless, Justice
Scalia’s reasoning failed to garner majority support in either Vieth or League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006), so partisan gerrymandering
remains justiciable under Bandemer, but with no majority-approved standard of what level of
partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Vieth’s Gap: Has the
Supreme Court Gone from Bad to Worse on Partisan Gerrymandering?, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 367, 393–94 (2005).
242. See OVERTON, supra note 24, at 109; Bazelon, supra note 54.
243. See OVERTON, supra note 24, at 110; Bazelon, supra note 54.
244. Gerken, supra note 54; see Michael Li, Legal Wrangling Over Texas Redistricting
Misses the Big Story, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 31, 2012, http://www.star-telegram
.com/2012/01/31/3702035/li-legal-wranglingover-texas.htm (“[C]oalition districts are protected
when minority groups act cohesively.”).
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diluting Latino voting rights.245 Likewise, in the Perrymander, the
Texas legislature excluded Latino voters from District 23 and
replaced them with Latino non-voters, but failed to evade a lawsuit
under Section 2.246 In both cases, the effect of discrimination against
Latinos, not against Democrats, is what prevented the wholesale
implementation of the Texas legislature’s redistricting plans.247
3. The Scope of Section 2’s Constraint on Partisan Gerrymandering
On the other hand, Section 2’s constraint on partisan
gerrymandering is limited because it applies only when minority
voting rights are diluted.248 After all, the Court upheld Tom DeLay’s
partisan gerrymander, for example, in all Texas districts but one,
District 23.249 Even so, Section 2 provides more protection for
minority voting rights than another avenue for relief—an equal
protection claim for racial discrimination in voting.250 Even though
race, unlike political affiliation in a partisan gerrymandering claim, is
an immutable characteristic protected by the Constitution and thus
subject to strict scrutiny,251 equal protection claims are still less
likely to succeed than Section 2 claims. Plaintiffs find it more
difficult to prove an infringement of minority voting rights under the
equal protection clause because such a claim requires a showing of
racially discriminatory intent, whereas a Section 2 claim does not.252
In fact, legislators drawing the maps understand how to avoid an
equal protection violation: they know that just about any redistricting
objective is permissible as long as they never mention race, just as
they know they are entitled to free speech over the airwaves as long
245. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 447. Some scholars even suggest that Justice Kennedy, writing for
the majority, expanded the Gingles precondition of compactness to be able to grant relief under
Section 2 because he recognized the injustice to District 23 but could not grant relief under the
Court’s partisan gerrymandering standard. Charles, supra note 222, at 1186–88. See supra text
accompanying notes 101–04, for discussion of Gingles.
246. Perez v. Texas, 891 F. Supp. 2d 808, 813 (W.D. Tex. 2012).
247. See id. at 826, 838; LULAC, 548 U.S. at 447. Although the Section 2 claim against the
Perrymander has not yet been decided on the merits, the litigation caused interim maps to be
drawn for the 2012 election. Perez, 891 F. Supp. 2d at 825.
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2006).
249. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 447.
250. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
251. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293–94 (2004) (plurality opinion).
252. See Davidson, supra note 58, at 38 (citing and discussing City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 104 (1980)).
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as they avoid the “seven dirty words.”253 Because a plaintiff needs
only to show a discriminatory effect for a violation of Section 2,254
even redistricting plans purportedly drawn for nonracial reasons may
be deemed unlawful if they have the effect of discriminating against
minorities.255
Now that race is widely considered a proxy for political party
affiliation,256 the VRA’s protections have become even more
important in protecting minority voting rights, especially when a
defendant jurisdiction can easily disclaim its intent to discriminate.
After all, the impact of a partisan gerrymander that deprives
minorities of an equal vote transcends the election itself and
effectively denies them a voice in the legislature and in the laws it
enacts thereafter.257 The VRA, therefore, is not only an important
protection against the abridgment of minority voting rights, but also
“the only real bulwark against gerrymandering”258 because it
provides more protection than a partisan gerrymandering claim or an
equal protection claim. Thus, the VRA is an important restraint on

253. See id. at 48 (noting how easily constitutional scrutiny for a gerrymander is averted
under equal protection analysis, even under the more exacting level of scrutiny for a protected
class in a racial gerrymandering claim, by avoiding producing evidence of discriminatory intent
(citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 777 (1978))).
254. See supra Part II.B (subject to the Gingles analysis).
255. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006).
256. BICKERSTAFF, supra note 2, at 12.
257. Peter H. Shuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation
of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (1987).
258. Bazelon, supra note 54; OVERTON, supra note 24, at 111. The counterargument is that
the Court’s creation of majority-minority districts to remedy minority vote dilution allows a
legislature to “pack” minorities into certain districts, thus draining the surrounding districts of
their minority voters and promoting polarization. Michael Carvin, Partner, Jones Day, Remarks at
the Voting Rights Act and Redistricting Panel at the George Washington University Law School
Symposium: Law and Democracy: A Symposium on Political Law (Nov. 16, 2012) at 40:58
[hereinafter Carvin Symposium], available at http://vimeo.com/user9108723/review/55780860
/5749aec1a9 (“Republicans like majority black districts or high-percentage minority districts
because the adjacent districts are going to be that much whiter, that much more gettable by
Republicans.”). This argument, however, addresses the Court’s remedy as set forth in Gingles,
not Section 2 itself. Nothing in Section 2’s text mandates the creation of single-member majorityminority districts. Section 2 only requires a minority group to have the ability to elect its
candidate of choice, which may be achievable through other means. See Allan Ides,
Approximating Democracy: A Proposal for Proportional Representation in the California
Legislature, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437, 451 (2011); Raskin, supra note 167, at 53; Daniel R.
Ortiz, Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 YALE
L.J. 144, 145 (1982); The Fair Voting Solution for U.S. House Elections, FAIRVOTE.ORG,
http://www.fairvote.org/fair-voting-solution#.UTeYORnrnXW (last visited Apr. 4, 2013).

1114

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1075

the political polarization and gridlock that may threaten its very
survival.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 2
I’ve got no basis for viewing [Section 2] as
constitutionally suspect today, and I’m not aware that it’s
been challenged in that respect since it was enacted. It may
have been, but as I say, I’m not aware of it.
—John G. Roberts Jr., to the Senate Judiciary
Committee in confirmation hearings after his nomination to
be Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court259
Although Section 2’s effects test is what makes the VRA an
effective means of challenging minority vote dilution and, by
extension, partisan gerrymandering, it may be exactly what makes
Section 2 unconstitutional to the Supreme Court. Although the
constitutionality of Section 2 has never been challenged before the
Court,260 the 1982 amendment to the VRA—Congress’s override of
City of Mobile v. Bolden—triggered constitutional concerns that had
not existed previously.261 In fact, one young attorney working at the
time in President Reagan’s Department of Justice argued
vociferously against the amendment of Section 2:262 John G. Roberts
Jr.263
Roberts warned that Section 2 would be constitutionally suspect
if the 1982 amendment were enacted.264 He argued that Section 2
originally mirrored the Fifteenth Amendment by requiring a showing
259. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 57, at 697 (citing Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., of
Maryland, to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 317 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts Jr., nominee, Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States)).
260. Though Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist called for a constitutional
inquiry into Section 2 in their dissent to the Court’s summary affirmance in Mississippi
Republican Executive Committee v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984), the Court has not yet granted
full review to a Section 2 challenge. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 134.
261. Hasen, supra note 55 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts as referring to the amended Section
2 as “not only constitutionally suspect, but also contrary to the fundamental [tenets] of the
legislative process on which the laws of this country are based”).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
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of both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect, but the
proposed 1982 amendment to the VRA mandated an effects-only test
that would not require a showing of discriminatory intent.265 This
uncoupling of the VRA from the constitutional amendment it
enforced raised constitutional questions in his eyes266 about whether
Congress was acting within its authority and whether the means of
enforcement it was proposing was “appropriate.”267 These questions
implicate the separation of powers doctrine as well as federalism
concerns.268
A. Separation of Powers
Whereas the final say in statutory interpretation belongs to
Congress,269 the last word in constitutional interpretation belongs to
the Court under the judicial supremacy principle set forth in Marbury
v. Madison.270 If the Court interprets a statute that enforces a
constitutional amendment, however, does a legislative override of
that decision constitute Congress’s valid authority over statutory
interpretation or an improper encroachment into the Court’s
exclusive authority over constitutional interpretation?271 Once
Congress amended Section 2, this question came to the fore.
As a provision of the VRA, Section 2 is part of the legislation
Congress enacted to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.272 Originally,
the statute echoed the amendment’s text273 to provide relief only if
vote discrimination resulted from purposeful discrimination based on
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.274 For years, however,
265. Memorandum from John Roberts to the Att’y Gen., Voting Rights Act: Section 2, 4
(Dec. 22, 1981) [hereinafter Roberts, Dec. 22 Memo], available at http://www.archives.gov/news
/john-roberts/accession-60-88-0498//030-black-binder1/folder030.pdf#page=9; see supra Part
II.B.3.
266. Memorandum from John Roberts to the Att’y Gen., supra note 265; see infra Part V.C.
267. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 133; Michael Pitts, Congressional Enforcement of
Affirmative Democracy Through Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 185,
203–16 (2005).
268. Pitts, supra note 267, at 203–16.
269. See supra Part III.A.2.b.
270. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”); Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at
134; Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 57, at 750.
271. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 133–34.
272. Grofman & Davidson, supra note 57, at 17.
273. THERNSTROM, supra note 113, at 81; Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 57, at 735.
274. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
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lower courts inferred a legislature’s discriminatory intent through a
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis because of the difficulties in
finding direct proof of discrimination.275 City of Mobile v. Bolden
halted this practice of allowing indirect evidence.276 In its decision,
the Court interpreted Section 2 to require direct proof of
discriminatory intent because the Fifteenth Amendment had also
done so.277 By amending the VRA to override that ruling, the
question arose whether Congress had acted within its powers by
interpreting Section 2, or had instead encroached on the Court’s
exclusive powers by attempting to interpret the Fifteenth
Amendment.278
Mere days after the 1982 amendment to the VRA became law,
however, the Court may have answered that question by issuing an
opinion suggesting that Section 2, as amended, did not violate the
separation of powers doctrine.279 In Rogers v. Lodge,280 the Court
decided an equal protection and Fifteenth Amendment challenge to
an at-large county election system in Georgia that had the
discriminatory effect of diluting the African-American community’s
votes.281 In its constitutional analysis, the Court inferred
discriminatory intent to dilute the minority vote using various forms
of circumstantial evidence, such as a history of official
discrimination, a majority vote requirement, and discrimination in
education and employment.282 In other words, the Court essentially
applied Congress’s amended Section 2 test to analyze constitutional
claims.283 In fact, the Court applied a totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis (without using that term) and considered indirect evidentiary
275. Pitts, supra note 267, at 204–05; see supra Part II.
276. Pitts, supra note 267, at 205 (citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–66 (1973)).
277. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131. The Court held that Section 2 merely
restated the Fifteenth Amendment, which the Court interpreted to require purposeful
discrimination. Id. at 60–62. Therefore, a violation of Section 2 would also require proof of
discriminatory intent. The Court also held that the Zimmer factors were insufficient to establish
discriminatory intent for an Equal Protection Claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 72–
73.
278. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 133.
279. See Pitts, supra note 267, at 206–07.
280. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
281. Id. at 615.
282. Id at 624–27. For example, some of the county’s schools were still essentially segregated
in 1982. Id. at 624–25.
283. See Davidson, supra note 58, at 41.
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factors that bore a striking resemblance to the Zimmer factors,284
“albeit cloaked in the language of intent.”285 The Court, therefore,
interpreted the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to require the
same standard Congress provided for enforcing those constitutional
amendments via Section 2.286 Thus, any argument that Congress
encroached on the domain of judicial interpretation and violated the
separation of powers by amending Section 2 became largely moot
after Rogers v. Lodge.287
B. Federalism
Whether Section 2 violates principles of federalism is a more
complex question. The evisceration of Section 5 makes the amended
Section 2 especially vulnerable to the arguments in the Court’s
Enforcement Clause jurisprudence.288 By eliminating the intent
requirement from Section 2, Congress made it easier for plaintiffs to
prove its violation but harder for scholars to prove its
constitutionality.
1. Congress’s Enforcement Power
Congress’s enforcement power under the Enforcement Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to pass remedial
measures appropriate to the constitutional wrongs they are meant to
redress.289 Congress enacted the VRA, however, specifically to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, which has its own enforcement
clause, and thus to remedy the wrong of denying or abridging the
right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.290 Because the Fifteenth Amendment’s own enforcement
284. See supra Part II.B, for discussion of Zimmer factors.
285. Davidson, supra note 58, at 41 (quoting Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A
Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 97 (1985)).
286. See Pitts, supra note 267, at 209.
287. Id.
288. Compare Katz Symposium, supra note 43, at 1:09:32 (arguing that Section 2 is
“undeniably vulnerable” for the same reasoning that the Court will invalidate Section 5 in Shelby
County), and Pamela Karlan, Professor, Stanford University, heard offscreen at Katz Symposium,
supra note 43, at 1:04:32 [hereinafter Karlan Offscreen] (asking why a court that has held Section
5 unconstitutional would uphold Section 2 as constitutional “to the extent that Section 2 goes
beyond forbidding that which the Constitution itself forbids”), with Carvin Symposium, supra
note 258 (implying that Section 2 is not as vulnerable as Section 5 to federalism concerns).
289. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524–25 (1997).
290. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
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clause simply restates the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,291 whether Congress’s power to enact the VRA and its
1982 amendment originates from the Fifteenth Amendment alone or
from both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments may be the crux
of the debate over Section 2’s constitutionality.
a. Congress’s enforcement power originating
from the Fifteenth Amendment
If Congress’s enforcement power originated with the Fifteenth
Amendment exclusively, then the means Congress chose to enforce
it—here, Section 2—may be judged by the highly deferential
“appropriate means” standard established in McCulloch v.
Maryland.292 In fact, McCulloch gave Congress so much deference
to enforce the Constitution293 that between McCulloch and the
drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, no congressional law was
struck down under this standard except, tellingly, in Dred Scott v.
Sandford.294
Furthermore, each of the five constitutional amendments
protecting the right to vote—the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth,
Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth—has its own enforcement clause
alluding to the McCulloch standard: “The Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”295 The separate
authorization for each one of these amendments suggests that
protecting voting rights is well within Congress’s power, and that
Congress is due great latitude in creating a means to enforce them.296
Finally, the Fifteenth Amendment is specifically limited to
preventing racial discrimination in voting, so—the argument goes—
it need not be subject to the limits of “congruence and
proportionality”; those limits were meant to prevent Congress from
291. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, with U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (containing
identical enforcement clauses).
292. “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819); Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—and Thus of Section
5, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 109, 119 (2013), available at http://harvardlawreview.org/2013/02/thelawfulness-of-section-5-and-thus-of-section-5.
293. Amar, supra note 292.
294. 60 U.S. 393 (1856); Amar, supra note 292, at 115.
295. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI; Amar, supra note 292, at 119.
296. Amar, supra note 292, at 119–20.
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having plenary power over a wide swath of rights such as life,
liberty, and property—not to mention unspecified privileges and
immunities—all of which fall under the Fourteenth Amendment.297
Because the Fifteenth Amendment focuses only on voting rights and
is expressly limited in scope, it does not trigger a need for the Court
to infer additional limits, as it did under the Fourteenth Amendment,
to protect states’ rights.298
Finally, in City of Rome v. United States,299 which was decided
the same day as City of Mobile v. Bolden, the Court interpreted the
Fifteenth Amendment’s enforcement clause to allow Congress to
forbid discriminatory voting practices, even if they do not violate the
amendment itself, as long as the measures Congress adopts are
“appropriate.”300 The Court determined that Congress could have
rationally concluded that banning electoral practices that were only
discriminatory in effect was an appropriate means of enforcing the
Fifteenth Amendment, even if the amendment only prohibited
intentional discrimination.301
The prevalent view, however, is that Congress’s power to enact
the VRA and its 1982 amendment does not stem exclusively from
the Fifteenth Amendment.302 If it did, Section 2 would not be
vulnerable in the view of election law scholars303 and, if the past is
any indication, in the eyes of the Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court.304

297. Id. at 120.
298. Id. at 119–20.
299. 446 U.S. 156 (1980), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
300. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 177. Though Rome implicated Section 5 of the VRA, the
interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment’s enforcement clause under McCulloch v. Maryland is
still applicable here. See 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 421 (1819).
301. City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 173, 176–77.
302. See Amar, supra note 292, at 119–20 (proffering the Fifteenth Amendment enforcement
power as a backup argument); Interview with Allan Ides, Professor, Loyola Law Sch., Los
Angeles, in L.A., Cal. (Feb. 28, 2013).
303. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 138; Katz, supra note 59, at 2407; Douglas
Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 749–52
(1998).
304. See Hasen, supra note 55.
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b. Congress’s enforcement power originating from
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
Most authorities agree that Congress’s power to enact and
amend the VRA originates from both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments,305 so Section 2 must comport with the Fourteenth
Amendment Enforcement Clause jurisprudence introduced in City of
Boerne v. Flores.306 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
may enforce rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but it cannot
create or alter them; a statute cannot expand or limit the underlying
constitutional right it is meant to enforce.307 The Boerne Court
applied a stricter standard of “appropriate” than the Court in
McCulloch:308 Congress’s chosen means of enforcement must be
congruent to the constitutional right it enforces and proportional to
the harm it is meant to address.309 By requiring congruence and
proportionality, the Boerne Court aimed to ensure that Congress did
not exceed its Enforcement Clause power,310 violating the principle
of federalism by assuming power reserved to the states by the Tenth
Amendment.311

305. Katz, supra note 59, at 2406 (“Congress’s enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendment are ‘coextensive.’”); Interview with Allan Ides, supra note 302. This view
is bolstered by the Court’s dicta in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v.
Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009), that “raised the possibility that a line of
Fourteenth Amendment power cases beginning with City of Boerne v. Flores could apply now to
review of voting rights.” Rick Hasen, The Curious Disappearance of Boerne and the Future
Jurisprudence of Voting Rights and Race, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2013, 7:10 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/the-curious-disappearance-of-boerne-and-the-futurejurisprudence-of-voting-rights-and-race. Although the NAMUDNO Court raised the issue
regarding the standard of review, it left the question open and instead ruled on statutory, rather
than constitutional, grounds. NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 204, 211.
306. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Interview with Allan Ides, supra note
302.
307. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
308. Compare id. (limiting the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause), with McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (defining the scope of the Necessary and Proper
Clause broadly).
309. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
310. Id. at 519–20. Because Congress’s enforcement power is merely remedial, enacting
substantive legislation that guarantees more than the constitutionally protected right the
legislation is supposed to enforce would exceed that power.
311. The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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At issue in Boerne was a federal statute enacted to legislatively
override the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith.312 In
Smith, the Court upheld an Oregon law that denied unemployment
benefits to two Native American employees who were fired for their
religious use of peyote.313 Because the law was neutral, generally
applicable, and did not intentionally ban religious practices, the
Court held that it did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth.314 In
response, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) to eliminate the requirement of religion-based
discriminatory intent and thus override Smith.315 The Boerne Court,
however, held that the RFRA failed the congruence and
proportionality test for which Boerne is now known.316 Because the
RFRA created a new right that was far greater in scope than the right
to the free exercise of religion provided in the Constitution,317 the
Court considered it not to be an “appropriate” means to enforce the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus struck down
the RFRA as unconstitutional except as applied to the federal
government.318
2. Why Section 2 May Not Survive Under Boerne
Despite the obvious similarities between the RFRA and Section
2 of the VRA, the Boerne Court actually compared the VRA
favorably to the RFRA in explaining why the RFRA exceeded
Congress’s enforcement power.319 Notably, however, the Boerne
Court compared the RFRA to Section 5, not Section 2.320 For
312. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by Boerne, 521 U.S. at
512.
313. Id. at 890.
314. Id. at 881–82.
315. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512–13.
316. Id. at 533.
317. ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 48
(Vicki Been et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010). The RFRA would have protected against even a slight
burden to any religion caused by any law—federal, state, or local—no matter how long that law
had been in place. The Boerne Court considered this right to be far greater than the evil that
Congress sought to remedy: the fear that neutral laws might sanction religious bigotry. See id.
318. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
319. Id. at 530–33.
320. Id.; Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 137.
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example, the Court noted that the VRA’s voluminous congressional
record of voting discrimination justified the need for the “uncommon
exercise” of Congress’s enforcement power in Section 5, whereas the
RFRA’s congressional record included no evidence of facially
neutral laws passed due to religious bigotry within the previous forty
years.321 Also, while Section 5 of the VRA applied only to
jurisdictions with histories of voting discrimination and regulated
only laws involving electoral changes, the RFRA restricted all
federal, state, and local laws, regardless of subject matter.322 Finally,
Section 5 included a sunset clause that originally limited its validity
to five years, but the RFRA included no time limit whatsoever.323
The Court thus found the RFRA to be too all-encompassing to be
congruent to the incidental burdens that generally applicable laws
place on certain religious practices absent intentional
discrimination.324 Therefore, the Court invalidated the RFRA as
applied to state and local governments.325
The RFRA was only the first of several federal laws that the
Court, under Chief Justice William Rehnquist, struck down under its
new congruence and proportionality standard.326 It was followed by
the Violence Against Women Act, the Americans With Disabilities
Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act.327 Surprisingly, however, the
Rehnquist Court, well-known for its “dramatic lack of deference to
Congress” and so-called “federalism revolution,” did not strike down
the VRA.328 In fact, the Rehnquist Court imported its Boerne
reasoning about the VRA from opinions upholding Section 5 that
were issued by the Warren Court,329 well-known for being far more
321. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530–31.
322. Id. at 532–33; see supra Part II, for discussion of Section 5.
323. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. Though the Court clarified that restrictions such as geographic
and time limits are not required, they “tend to ensure Congress’[s] means are proportionate to
ends legitimate under [the Enforcement Clause].” Id. at 533.
324. Id. at 532, 536.
325. Id. at 536. The RFRA is unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments,
although it still applies to the federal government under Congress’s Article I powers. Laycock,
supra note 303, at 745.
326. J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
1965–2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 726 (2008).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517–27 (e.g., citing heavily from South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966), and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)).
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deferential to Congress than the Rehnquist Court was at the time of
Boerne.330
Yet sixteen years later, the Roberts Court did not even refer to
Boerne when it eviscerated Section 5 of the VRA, the very provision
that served as a yardstick of congruence and proportionality for the
Rehnquist Court.331 Citing volumes of evidence of voting
discrimination presented in the legislative record, the Rehnquist
Court in Boerne considered Section 5 of the VRA to be proportional
to the widespread and pervasive harm it was remedying.332 Even so,
the Roberts Court effectively invalidated Section 5—without
addressing any standard of review—despite more than 15,000 pages
of new voting discrimination evidence that Congress introduced to
reauthorize the statute in 2006.333 By contrast, the passage of Section
2’s amendment was supported by “relatively sparse findings of
intentional discrimination,”334 much like the RFRA.335 Though the
Boerne Court considered Section 5’s geographic and temporal
limitations to support Section 5’s congruence and proportionality,336
Section 2 has neither limitation.337 It applies across the country and is
a permanent provision, much like the RFRA.338
330. See Erwin Chemerinksy, Assessing Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
1331, 1338 (2006).
331. Hasen, supra note 305 (“Perhaps the biggest surprise of Shelby County is that the
majority purported to ignore this Boerne issue . . . even though this has been a key issue involving
the constitutionality of Section 5 for years.”).
332. Laycock, supra note 303, at 748.
333. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2636 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing
the “systematic evidence that intentional racial discrimination in voting remains so serious and
widespread in covered jurisdictions that section 5 preclearance is still needed” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 723 (2014) ([The majority in] “Shelby County ignores the
Boerne/Katzenbach standard of review question entirely . . . and it shifts the constitutional
question from one focused on the constitutionality of section 5 preclearance to one solely
addressing the constitutionality of the section 4 coverage formula.”). By holding Section 4 to be
unconstitutional, the Court effectively invalidated Section 5 as well because Section 4 determined
which jurisdictions were subject to Section 5. See Hasen, supra note 305.
334. Katz, supra note 59, at 2404.
335. Id.
336. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530–33 (1997).
337. Katz, supra note 59, at 2404.
338. Id.; Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532–33. On the other hand, Section 2 may not be considered a
law of general applicability like the RFRA because it prohibits only the effect of racial
discrimination in voting. The RFRA as passed prohibited the effect of religious discrimination in
all laws: federal, state, and local. Interview with Aimee Dudovitz, Professor, Loyola Law Sch.,
Los Angeles, in L.A., Cal. (Feb. 15, 2013).
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In fact, the amended Section 2 looks a lot less like Section 5, of
which the Boerne Court approved, and more like the RFRA, which
the Boerne Court severely limited.339 For one, both Section 2 and the
RFRA encompass nearly the entire scope of the constitutional right
that they were enacted to enforce.340 Both Section 2 and the RFRA
were enacted to legislatively override the Court’s legal standard
requiring discriminatory intent.341 Consequently, both statutes forbid
more conduct than the Constitution itself prohibits, thus expanding
the constitutional right they were enacted to enforce.342 In other
words, Section 2 is “doctrinally irreconcilable” with Boerne.343 In
fact, Professor Douglas Laycock, who argued in support of the
RFRA before the Boerne Court, maintains that Section 2 would not
withstand a Boerne analysis.344 Noting all the similarities between
Section 2 and the RFRA, Laycock concluded: “The Court summarily
upheld the 1982 Act in 1984, but [Boerne] implied the opposite
result.”345 The summary affirmance of Section 2 to which Laycock
referred occurred years before Boerne.346 But in that summary
affirmance, Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist
dissented, calling for full judicial review of Section 2.347 This fact
further suggests that even though the Boerne Court implied Section 5
was congruent and proportional,348 it would not have come to the
same conclusion about Section 2.349 As a result, Section 2 is likely
the next target for constitutional challenge, and it would probably fail
a Boerne analysis, especially in light of Shelby County v. Holder’s350
restriction on Congress’s power against the states.351
339. Katz, supra note 59, at 2403–04; Laycock, supra note 303, at 749–52.
340. Laycock, supra note 303, at 749–52.
341. Id.; Katz, supra note 59, at 2403–04.
342. Katz, supra note 59, at 2404; Karlan Offscreen, supra note 288.
343. Katz, supra note 59, at 2369; see Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 137 (“[If] City of
Boerne serves as a guide, it is hard to believe the Voting Rights Act as amended in 1982 will
survive . . . judicial review.”).
344. Laycock, supra note 303, at 752.
345. Id.
346. Miss. Republican Exec. Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1005–06 (1984).
347. Id. at 1005 (Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
348. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532–33 (1997).
349. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 137; Katz, supra note 59, at 2404–07; Laycock,
supra note 303, at 748.
350. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
351. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 137; Katz, supra note 59, at 2404–07; Laycock,
supra note 303. Professor Richard Hasen surmises that
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3. How Section 2 Might Survive in Spite of Boerne
In spite of the ease with which the Roberts Court might strike
down Section 2 under Boerne, if the Court wanted to uphold it,
several arguments are available. Using the Boerne Court’s method of
analogizing to other statutes, if the Roberts Court compares Section 2
to statutes other than the RFRA, it may be able to construe it to be
congruent and proportional.
Compared to a functional Section 5, for example, Section 2
might be able to withstand a constitutional challenge. After all,
Section 2 places a considerably smaller burden on federalism than
Section 5,352 so the Court might require less justification to find
Section 2 to be an appropriate means to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment.353 Section 5 of the VRA is an “uncommon exercise” of
Congress’s power that must be justified by “exceptional conditions”
to be considered an appropriate means of enforcing the Fifteenth
Amendment.354 Though the Court recently curbed this
“unprecedented” power,355 Section 2 is the very model of a more
common exercise of Congress’s enforcement power.356 Unlike
Section 5’s preclearance regime, which puts the burden on the
defendant jurisdiction to disprove discrimination in a new voting
law, a Section 2 claim requires plaintiffs to bear the traditional
burden of proof.357 Section 2 also does not allow the federal
government to presume a law to be discriminatory until proven
otherwise, nor does it require the claim to be filed with the
Department of Justice or the United States District Court for the
the Chief Justice obfuscated the standard of review in [Shelby] as a time bomb: in a
future case he could cite to NAMUDNO and Shelby County fn. 1 for the proposition
that the Court has held that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendment standards are the
same, and then bootstrapping the Boerne standard into a Fifteenth Amendment case.
Saying so directly would have made [Shelby’s] controversial decision even more
provocative.
Hasen, supra note 305. If Professor Hasen’s prediction is right, then he expects the next
constitutional challenges to target Section 2. Id.
352. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 137.
353. See id.
354. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966).
355. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2626 (2013). Section 5 became inoperable once
Shelby invalidated Section 4, which determined the jurisdictions covered by Section 5. Id. at 2648
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
356. Pitts, supra note 267, at 210–11.
357. See id. at 211.
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District of Columbia.358 Like most federal laws, Section 2 applies to
all jurisdictions equally across the country, not just those with
histories of discrimination, as does Section 5.359 Section 2 does not
prevent a discriminatory voting law from being implemented but
instead provides a judicial remedy after the discrimination has
already occurred.360 In essence, Section 2 looks like other federal
statutes except that it does not require proof of intentional
discrimination, unlike its underlying constitutional right.361 Even if
the Court considers Section 2’s effects test to be “uncommon”
compared to other federal statutes, it is still not as “uncommon” as
Section 5’s effects test, burden shift, coverage formula, and forum
restrictions.362 In fact, Section 5 is still on the books, which makes
Section 2 look fairly ordinary—and less burdensome to federalism—
by comparison.
Besides, an effects test is not necessarily “uncommon,” as a
comparison to other federal statutes illustrates.363 For example, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 not only prohibits intentional
discrimination in all aspects of employment, but also prohibits
neutral policies that may have the effect of limiting job opportunities
for some racial groups.364 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968
(and as amended in 1988) is also considered to have an effects test
for prohibiting discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing of
housing based on race, color, religion, national origin, or familial
status.365 Because these statutes employ effects tests in the everyday
realms of housing and employment, a comparison to them may make
the use of an effects test in Section 2 appear to be more common and
358. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
359. HEBERT ET AL., supra note 104, at 32.
360. JUSTIN LEVITT, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 47–48 (2010).
361. See Pitts, supra note 267, at 203, 209. The Fifteenth Amendment protects the right to
vote from intentional discrimination. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
362. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a), with id. § 1973c (requiring the state or political
subdivision to show that its proposed voting provision will not have “the effect of diminishing the
ability of any citizens of the United States on account of race or color” to elect their preferred
candidate).
363. Pitts, supra note 267, at 210–11.
364. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); Questions and Answers About Race and Color Discrimination
in Employment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race
-color.html#N_71_ (last modified May 16, 2006).
365. Carvin Symposium, supra note 258, at 04:13; The Fair Housing Act, U.S. DEP’T HOUS.
& URBAN DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal
_opp/progdesc/title8 (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).
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less burdensome. The test would then require less justification to be
found congruent and proportional to the harm of minority vote
dilution.
In addition, Section 2’s burden on federalism may be seen as
minimal simply based on its operation. For example, if a
jurisdiction’s redistricting plan violates Section 2, the jurisdiction is
usually given an opportunity to remedy its own plan by redrawing
the maps.366 Moreover, requiring state and local governments to stop
diluting minority voting power is hardly more intrusive to states’
rights than the Constitution’s own prohibition on abridging the rights
of minorities to vote.367 Furthermore, unlike other congressional
remedies such as the Patent Act, Section 2 does not provide
monetary damages as a remedy, so state and local governments need
not fear plaintiffs’ raiding their treasuries.368
If a comparison to the RFRA struck down in Boerne cannot be
avoided, Section 2 may still be distinguished in ways that may
ultimately save it from invalidation. Unlike the RFRA, Section 2 not
only protects the fundamental right of voting, which preserves all
other rights,369 but also protects the suspect class of racial and ethnic
minorities, so Congress should merit considerable deference for
crafting Section 2 of the VRA as an enforcement mechanism.370
Furthermore, because the VRA enforces not only the Fifteenth
Amendment but also the Fourteenth371 and the Elections Clause,372
Congress’s enforcement power was at its strongest when it enacted
the revised Section 2.373 Finally, unlike the RFRA and other laws
struck down by the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions,374
366. Pitts, supra note 267, at 214.
367. Id. at 215.
368. Id. at 211–12.
369. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
370. Persily, supra note 90, at 252.
371. See Katz, supra note 59, at 2384 (The precedent-supported view is that “Congress’s
powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments are ‘coextensive.’”).
372. See Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend
the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007); Daniel Tokaji, Shelby County v. Holder:
Don’t Forget the Elections Clause, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 13, 2013, 11:43 AM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/shelby-county-v-holder-dont-forget-the-elections-clause/.
373. Persily, supra note 90, at 252–53.
374. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down the Violence
Against Women Act); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free
School Zones Act).
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Section 2 has already been in effect for almost a half century as part
of the VRA, “the crown jewel of the civil rights movement.”375 In
fact, the Rehnquist Court’s preservation of the VRA precedents
despite its “federalism revolution” in the 1990s has been attributed to
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s unwillingness to overrule such historic and
important decisions.376 In the previous decade, the Burger Court
upheld Section 5 in City of Rome v. United States, on the same day
that it gutted Section 2 in City of Mobile v. Bolden, purportedly
because Chief Justice Burger was also unwilling to completely
dismantle “the most effective civil rights statute in history.”377 Now
that the Roberts Court has gutted Section 5, will it be willing to
finish off the VRA by striking down Section 2? The answer may lie
less within the constitutional arguments surrounding Section 2 than
within the Justices’ personal ideologies.378
V. THE POLARIZATION OF THE SUPREME COURT
“The absolute worst violation of the judge’s oath is to
decide a case based on a partisan political or philosophical
basis, rather than what the law requires.”
—Justice Antonin Scalia379
Despite strong legal arguments both for and against upholding
Section 2, its fate may be viewed, rightfully or not, as subject to the
prevailing ideology of the current Supreme Court Justices.380 A great
majority of Americans already believe that the Justices rule
according to their personal or political views.381 If the current
375. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 57, at 763.
376. Katz, supra note 59, at 2369–70, 2370 n.166.
377. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 57, at 763.
378. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 155 (“[T]he constitutional question at the heart of
Section 2 will not be determined by law as commonly understood, but rather, the way the Justices
have always done it: in accordance with the individual policy preferences of the Justices in the
majority.”).
379. Lyric Winik, Are There Too Many Lawyers?, PARADE (Sept. 14, 2008),
http://www.parade.com/hot-topics/intelligence-report/archive/too-many-lawyers.
380. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 155.
381. Seventy-five percent of Americans believe the Justices rule according to their personal
beliefs at some point, while only 12.5 percent believe that they rule solely on legal analysis. See
Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in New Poll, N.Y.
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conservative Court majority aligns itself with Chief Justice Roberts’s
views, the Roberts Court would not be the first to be guided by a
Chief Justice’s “substantive vision.”382 Whenever the Court has
intervened in the political sphere, however, it has inevitably been
regarded as improperly partisan.383 The highly charged cases of Bush
v. Gore384 and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission385
only bolstered that perception, especially because their decisions
were split 5–4 along both ideological and partisan lines.386 This
alignment between the ideology and partisan affiliation of each of the
Justices has only served to reinforce their image as political
players.387
A. How the Court Became Polarized
Although ideological polarization among Justices on the
Supreme Court is nothing new, the alignment between ideology and
partisan affiliation is a recent phenomenon.388 In the past several
years, Justices whose ideologies were not already aligned with those
of the presidents who appointed them were succeeded by Justices
whose ideologies were more closely aligned with their appointing
presidents.389 In 2006, for example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, a
moderate conservative nominated by a Republican president, was
succeeded by Justice Samuel Alito, a strong conservative nominated
by a Republican president.390 Three years later, Justice David Souter,
a liberal nominated by a Republican president, was succeeded by
Sonia Sotomayor, a liberal nominated by a Democratic president.391
TIMES, June 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/us/politics/44-percent-of-americans
-approve-of-supreme-court-in-new-poll.html.
382. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, for example, “was very successful in that the Court
adopted his views and visions” in every major area of constitutional law. Chemerinsky, supra
note 330, at 1331, 1334–35. The Marshall Court is now known for Chief Justice John Marshall’s
vision of judicial review and federalism, and the Warren Court is known for Chief Justice Earl
Warren’s vision of “a more equal society better protecting the dignity of individuals.” Id. at 1331.
383. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting
Rights Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1538–39 (2008).
384. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
385. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
386. Liptak & Kopicki, supra note 381.
387. See Hasen, supra note 53, at 243.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
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Finally, in 2010, Justice John Paul Stevens, a moderate liberal
nominated by a Republican president,392 was succeeded by Justice
Elena Kagan, a liberal nominated by a Democratic president.393 Now
the Court consists exclusively of conservative Justices nominated by
Republicans and liberal Justices nominated by Democrats.394 Perhaps
because presidents want to ensure that the Justices they appoint will
continue to rule in accordance with their own views instead of
eventually tipping the balance of the Court in the other direction, the
Court’s polarization may begin at the nomination stage. Nominees
may be chosen for their reliably liberal or conservative—rather than
moderate—views so that the Court’s ideological composition is
predetermined even before the nominees become Justices.395
Like Congress, then, the Court is losing its moderate voices, and
with similar results: the Supreme Court is more polarized than
ever396 and will remain so for the foreseeable future.397 In fact, the
2006 Supreme Court term—in which Justice Alito replaced Justice
O’Connor—had the highest number of cases split along ideological
lines in the Court’s history.398 Professor Pamela Karlan noted: “[The
Court’s different worldviews] were not always connected to partisan
interests in the way that they are today. In the past, you had crosscutting alliances, [but] that is disappearing.”399
392. Id.; Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at F50.
393. Hasen, supra note 53, at 243.
394. Id.
395. However, the successful nominees are usually those who are not necessarily viewed as
extreme by the opposing party, or else their nominations will not pass the Senate, whether they
are nominated to the Supreme Court or its stepping stone—a circuit court of appeals. See Bill
Mears, Senate Republicans Block Floor Vote for Key Obama Judicial Nominee, CNN
(Mar. 6, 2013, 1:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/06/politics/senate-judicial-nominee.
396. John Hudson, The Supreme Court Is More Polarized Than Ever, THE ATLANTIC WIRE
(June 19, 2012), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2012/06/supreme-court-more-polarized
-ever/53698.
397. See Rosen, supra note 392.
398. Id. (explaining that the brief honeymoon period in which the Court managed to issue
some unanimous decisions during the first few months of Chief Justice Roberts’s term abruptly
ended once Justice Alito took the bench); see AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP,
SUMMARY MEMO: END OF TERM STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OCTOBER TERM 2008 2 (2009),
available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/summary-memo-final.pdf.
To date, the 2006 term holds the record for the most 5–4 split decisions, although Alito joined the
Court after the term had already begun.
399. Karlan Symposium, supra note 98, at 42:00. Justice Ginsburg also acknowledged the
Court’s “spirit of bipartisanship which prevailed in the early 90’s.” Colleen Walsh, Ginsburg
Holds Court, HARVARD GAZETTE (Feb. 6, 2013), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2013/02
/ginsburg-holds-court.
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1. The Loss of Moderates and Judicial Neutrality on the Court
Justice Stevens, for example, was part of those cross-cutting
alliances in the past. Though he was known as a liberal icon as a
Justice, he did not consider himself to be liberal and, as the last of a
breed,400 he declined to acknowledge any party affiliation while he
was on the Court.401 He explained that he only appeared to be liberal
because he had been joined by increasingly conservative Justices.402
Justice Stevens’s legal opinions throughout his tenure on the Court
actually were consistent with the opinions he had expressed during
his confirmation hearings in 1975.403 At the time of his nomination,
he was known to be a moderate Republican,404 although now he
acknowledges that moderate Republicans—such as Justices John
Harlan, Potter Stewart, Lewis Powell, Harry Blackmun, David
Souter, and himself405—would no longer be nominated to the Court
today.406
Justice Stevens calls himself a “judicial conservative,” which he
defines as someone “who tries to follow precedents and ‘who
submerges his or her own views of sound policy to respect those
decisions by the people who have authority to make them.’”407 The
Court, however, did not always share his judicial restraint, leading
him to predict in Citizens United: “The path [the Court] has taken to
reach its outcome will, I fear, do damage to this institution. . . .
Essentially, five Justices were unhappy with the limited nature of the
case before us, so they changed the case to give themselves an
opportunity to change the law.”408 He also decried the loss of the
400. Rosen, supra note 392; Jeffrey Toobin, After Stevens, NEW YORKER (Mar. 22, 2010),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/03/22/100322fa_fact_toobin.
401. Rosen, supra note 392.
402. Justice Stevens explained in 2007: “Including myself, every judge who has been
appointed to the Court since Lewis Powell has been more conservative than his or her
predecessor. Except maybe Justice Ginsburg. That’s bound to have an effect on the Court.”
Rosen, supra note 392.
403. Id.
404. Justice Stevens was nominated by moderate Republican President Gerald Ford. Id.
405. See Toobin, supra note 400.
406. See Rosen, supra note 392.
407. Id. Nevertheless, Robert Nagel criticized Justice Stevens for his “ambitious moral
agenda” and disregard of established legal doctrine in imposing his own personal preferences. Id.
408. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 396 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Toobin, supra note 400 (“If it is not necessary to decide on broad
constitutional grounds, when other grounds are available, doesn’t that create a likelihood that
people will think you’re not following the rules?”).
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Court’s political neutrality in Bush v. Gore: “Although we may never
know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s
Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is
the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the
rule of law.”409 Justice Stevens’s retirement in 2010 left the Court “as
just another place where Democrats and Republicans fight.”410
2. Partisanship of the Current Court
As Justice Stevens predicted, the Court is no longer seen as
impartial. “The Court itself is a product of election returns,”
Professor Pamela Karlan has opined, adding, “This Court is a
product of Bush v. Gore, because had Bush v. Gore come out the
other way . . . it would have been David Tatel not John Roberts [as
Chief Justice].”411 Although Justice Scalia disclaims the role of
personal politics in our judicial system,412 media reports of some
current Justices’ possible conflicts of interest413—and publicly
expressed predispositions414 on issues that could be interpreted

409. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Toobin, supra note 400.
410. Toobin, supra note 400.
411. Karlan Symposium, supra note 98, at 03:36 (referring to Judge David Tatel of the D.C.
Circuit).
412. Winik, supra note 379.
413. See Michael Kirkland, Under the U.S. Supreme Court: Justices Get Down, Get Funky
with Tea Party, UPI (Mar. 6, 2011, 3:46 AM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/03/06
/Under-the-US-Supreme-Court-Justices-get-down-get-funky-with-Tea-Party/UPI13681299401160 (noting that, though some current Justices are criticized for fraternizing with
conservative Republican partisans, in the past, the same may have been said of some former
Justices with liberal Democrats).
414. Dahlia Lithwick, Grumpy Old Justices, SLATE.COM (Aug. 26, 2013, 6:16 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/08/ginsburg_and_scalia_s_s
upreme_court_complaints_do_they_agree_about_what.html (citing Justice Scalia’s speech
“tipping his hand about the outcome in the gay marriage cases”); Editorial, Justice Ginsburg’s
Misdirection Ahead of the Gay Marriage Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/04/03/opinion/justice-ginsburgs-misdirection-ahead-of-the-gay-marriage-rulings.html?
_r=0 (Although Justice Ginsburg gave no indication how she would vote in the same-sex
marriage cases that were before the Court at the time, her widely quoted comment about Roe v.
Wade going “too far, too fast” was “routinely cited to argue for a timid resolution on the issue.”);
Overton, supra note 110 (“Even aside from improperly commenting on a pending case, Scalia is
wrong” about Section 5 of the VRA being a form of “racial entitlement.”); see Collin Levy,
Litigating for Liberty, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052970203513604577144902274972614.html (quoting Chip Mellor, chief of the
Institute for Justice, citing Justice Scalia’s prediction that a particular case would be overturned
soon).
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(accurately or not) to influence their legal opinions415—undermine
whatever is left of judicial neutrality in the public eye.416 The
perception of Justices as partisan players may be the reason that the
Court now engenders a distrust among Americans that transcends
ideological lines.417 Congress, it turns out, is not the only branch of
government to lose the public’s trust because of its outward displays
of partisanship.418
B. Justice Kennedy’s Swing Vote
Although Justice Kennedy is considered to be at the ideological
center of the Supreme Court, he is also a conservative Justice on an
increasingly conservative Court.419 In the 2009 term of the Supreme
Court, for example, he voted ten out of twelve times with the
conservative bloc on cases deemed to present ideological questions,
including Citizens United.420 It is well known that, when the Court
splits along ideological lines, Justice Kennedy’s vote is almost
always decisive.421 During the 2006 term—the first full term in
which Justice Alito replaced Justice O’Connor—the Court split five

415. Ashby Jones, On Justice Thomas and the Supreme Court’s Strange Recusal Process,
WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (Oct. 28, 2010, 10:31 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/10/28/on-justicethomas-and-the-supreme-courts-strange-recusal-process (suggesting a possible conflict of interest
for Justice Thomas due to his wife’s political activities); Kirkland, supra note 413 (suggesting
possible conflicts for Justice Scalia for hunting with Dick Cheney while a Cheney case was on the
docket; and Justices Scalia and Thomas for attending events hosted by Republican financiers the
Koch brothers shortly after Citizens United; and Justice Kagan for having served as U.S. Solicitor
General while the Affordable Care Act was being negotiated).
416. Robert Greenberger, Scalia Defends His Impartiality in Cheney Case, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 19, 2004, http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB107962231690759140,00.html (citing a speech
given by Justice Scalia in which he criticized the reasoning of an appeals court ruling that was
subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court); Jonathan Turley, Justice Scalia Is a Political Star
and That’s Bad for the Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012102923.html.
417. Down from 66 percent approval in the late 1980s, the Court’s approval ratings now
register at about 40 percent among liberals and conservatives alike. Liptak & Kopicki, supra note
381.
418. Id.
419. Andrew Cohen, The Kennedy Court, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 6:18 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18567_162-1774288.html; Linda Greenhouse, Is the Kennedy
Court Over?, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (July 15, 2010, 9:39 PM), http://opinionator.blogs
.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/rethinking-the-kennedy-court.
420. Greenhouse, supra note 419.
421. Id.; Cohen, supra note 419.
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to four in twenty-four cases, and Justice Kennedy was in the majority
in all twenty-four.422
Although he has consistently opposed affirmative action,423
Justice Kennedy’s record on voting rights is mixed,424 so his vote
may truly be a swing vote if Section 2 is finally given full judicial
review. For example, Justice Kennedy voted with the conservative
bloc to uphold Tom DeLay’s mid-decade redistricting plan against a
claim of unlawful partisan gerrymandering,425 but he also wrote that
it violated Section 2 of the VRA because “the State took away the
Latinos’ opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise it.”426
Still, some scholars propose that it was “out of character” for him to
side with minorities, and that he did so in LULAC—the first case in
which minority plaintiffs ever succeeded in a vote dilution claim at
the Supreme Court level—merely because the plaintiffs were unable
to prevail on the partisan gerrymandering claim despite the plan’s
“rank partisanship.”427 In another Section 2 case in 2009, though,
Justice Kennedy wrote that “racial discrimination and racially
polarized voting are not ancient history” and that “[m]uch remains to
be done to ensure that citizens of all races have equal
opportunity.”428 On the other hand, these cases both involved
statutory, rather than constitutional, interpretations of Section 2.
Because the constitutionality of Section 2 has not yet been
challenged in front of the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy’s views
on it are still unknown. When the Court issued another statutory
interpretation of Section 2 in 1991, however, Justice Kennedy wrote
a separate two-sentence dissent to point out that the Court did not
address the question of Section 2’s constitutionality.429 Because
Section 2’s constitutionality rests largely on states’ rights, an issue
dear to Justice Kennedy,430 he might base his decision in favor of
422. Greenhouse, supra note 419.
423. Charles Lane, Kennedy Reigns Supreme on Court, WASH. POST, July 2, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/01/AR2006070100936.html.
424. Id.
425. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 408 (2006).
426. Id. at 440.
427. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 153–54 (citing Charles, supra note 222, at 1187).
428. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25 (2009); Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 154.
429. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 418 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
430. Lyle Denniston, On Marriage, Kennedy in Control, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 26, 2013,
12:31 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=161752 (referring to states’ rights as a “usual
concern” of Justice Kennedy). Also, tellingly, in the oral argument on Section 5 in Shelby, Justice
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states’ rights—and rule against Section 2—even if he otherwise
supports the civil right at issue. Although Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion overturning the federal Defense of Marriage Act combined
two of his “jurisprudential loves”—states’ rights and gay rights431—
the reasons he signed onto the Court’s decision to eviscerate Section
5 during the same term were left unstated.432 The majority opinion in
that case reveals little of Justice Kennedy’s views on the VRA, but
makes amply clear the views of its author, Chief Justice Roberts.433
C. Chief Justice Roberts’s Vote
Chief Justice Roberts’s views on the constitutionality of Section
2 are already known.434 When he worked as a Justice Department
attorney in the Reagan Administration, he fervently advocated the
notion of trying to kill the Senate bill that eventually became the
1982 amendment to the VRA, including the amended Section 2,435
the legislative override of City of Mobile v. Bolden. Roberts
vigorously argued that the amended Section 2436 would lose its
“constitutional moorings” if it no longer mirrored the Fifteenth
Amendment.437
Although political Justice Department employees are expected
to support their president’s policy positions, the written record of
Roberts’s own memoranda suggests he was perhaps even more
invested than President Reagan in defeating the bill.438 Going well
beyond the president’s “if-it-ain’t-broke-don’t-fix-it” rationale for
Kennedy asked the solicitor general, “[I]f Alabama wants to have heroes to the Civil Rights
Movement, if it wants to acknowledge the wrongs of its past, is it better off doing that if it’s an
own independent sovereign or if it’s under the trusteeship of the United States Government?”
Shelby Transcript, supra note 74, at 50–51.
431. Garrett Epps, Kennedy’s Marriage Ruling Is About Gay Rights, Not States’ Rights, THE
ATLANTIC (June 26, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/06
/kennedys-marriage-ruling-is-about-gay-rights-not-states-rights/277251.
432. See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2617.
433. See id.
434. Roberts, Jan. 22 Memo, supra note 130.
435. Hasen, supra note 55; see Mock, supra note 55.
436. See Memorandum from John Roberts to the Att’y Gen., Talking Points for the White
House Meeting on the Voting Rights Act (Jan. 26, 1982) [hereinafter Roberts, Jan. 26 Memo],
available at http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-88-0498/030-black-binder1
/folder030.pdf#page=1.
437. Roberts, Jan. 22 Memo, supra note 130.
438. Hasen, supra note 55; Mock, supra note 55 (“[Roberts] sounded every alarm about why
the discriminatory effect clause shouldn’t happen.”).
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opposing the bill,439 Roberts decried the revised Section 2 as “not
only constitutionally suspect but also contrary to the most
fundamental tenants [sic] of the legislative process on which the laws
of this country are based.”440 In fact, a common thread throughout
his memoranda leading up to the bill’s passage was the pronounced
urgency with which he advocated defeating it.441
Since joining the Supreme Court in 2005, Chief Justice Roberts
has presided over five442 VRA cases on the merits and has
consistently ruled to restrict the scope of the statute in every one.443
This record suggests that his general disposition toward Section 2 has
not changed much since his days at the Justice Department,444
especially in light of his well-known pursuit of a color-blind
Constitution445 and his oft-cited opposition to racial preferences.446
Now that race-based remedies are disfavored by the Court,447 which
439. Roberts, Jan. 26 Memo, supra note 436.
440. Roberts, Dec. 22 Memo, supra note 265.
441. E.g., id.; Memorandum from John Roberts to the Att’y Gen., Voting Rights Act
Testimony: Questions & Answers, 23 (Jan. 21, 1982), available at http://www.archives.gov/news
/john-roberts/accession-60-88-0495/040-civil-rights-division/folder040.pdf#page=20;
Roberts,
Jan. 22 Memo, supra note 130; Memorandum from John Roberts to the Att’y Gen., Voting Rights
Act, 22 (Jan. 25, 1982), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-880498/folder030.pdf#page=9; Roberts, Jan. 26 Memo, supra note 436.
442. See Joshua A. Douglas, The Voting Rights Act Through the Justices’ Eyes: NAMUDNO
and Beyond, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, at 8–9 (2009), http://www.texaslrev.com//wp-content/uploads
/Douglas-88-TLRSA-1.pdf. Including Shelby County v. Holder makes five. Although the Court
has decided procedural matters in Perez v. Perry, its decision was not on the merits. 132 S. Ct.
934 (2012). The Court also vacated the denial of preclearance for the Perrymander in Texas v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013), and remanded that Section 5 case to the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia in light of the Shelby decision striking down Section 4, making
Section 5 inoperable.
443. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Douglas, supra note 442.
444. See Douglas, supra note 442.
445. See Ronald Collins, Q & A with Jeffrey Toobin, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 22, 2012,
10:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/q-a-with-jeffrey-toobin.
446. In a Section 2 case, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, “It is a sordid business, this divvying us
up by race.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In an opinion striking down a voluntary
affirmative action plan, he wrote: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race.” Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
447. Fuentes-Rohwer, Future, supra note 85, at 152 (“It is clear that five Justices on the Court
have strong reservations about the use of race in general.”); Ellen Katz, On Overreaching, or Why
Rick Perry May Save the Voting Rights Act But Destroy Affirmative Action, 11 ELECTION L.J.
420, 425 (2012) (citing dissents by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas in affirmative action
cases); Pitts, supra note 267, at 186 (“[T]he Court has exhibited a general distaste for race-based
remedies.”).
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effectively struck down “the heart of the VRA” in a decision that
Justice Ginsburg called “stunning in terms of activism,”448 Section
2’s future looks bleak in the Roberts Court.449
Nevertheless, Chief Justice Roberts’s vote may not necessarily
be preordained. He has already demonstrated his awareness of the
stakes for the Court in another politically charged case: National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,450 which upheld the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, also commonly
known as Obamacare).451 As the only Justice to cast a vote that was
contrary to his partisan affiliation on the most contentious
provision—the individual mandate—the Chief Justice allowed the
Act to pass almost intact.452 In doing so, Chief Justice Roberts
demonstrated that he was well aware of the Court’s precarious
position in the public eye in the wake of Bush v. Gore and Citizens
United.453 Striking down the health care law with a decision split
along ideological lines would only have solidified the already widely
held view that the Court was just another player in polarized
politics.454 In addition, because the legal challenges to the individual
mandate were “at best novel and at worst frivolous,” a one-vote
margin to strike it down might have imperiled the Court’s
legitimacy.455 The press had already portrayed Chief Justice Roberts
as “out to get” President Obama,456 and the President reminded
conservative critics of the judicial activism they had denounced for

448. Adam Liptak, Court Is ‘One of Most Activist,’ Ginsburg Says, Vowing to Stay, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/us/court-is-one-of-most-activist
-ginsburg-says-vowing-to-stay.html (referring to Shelby, 133 S.Ct. 2612).
449. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 85, at 126–27.
450. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
451. Id. at 2608.
452. Id.; David L. Franklin, Why Did Roberts Do It? To Save the Court, SLATE
(June 28, 2012, 3:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012
/06/john_roberts_broke_with_conservatives_to_preserve_the_supreme_court_s_legitimacy.html.
453. Franklin, supra note 452.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id.; Daniel Epps, In Health Care Ruling, Roberts Steals a Move from John Marshall’s
Playbook, THE ATLANTIC (June 28, 2012, 12:47 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national
/archive/2012/06/in-health-care-ruling-roberts-steals-a-move-from-john-marshalls-playbook
/259121.
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allowing an unelected judiciary to overturn laws passed by the
people.457
In response, Chief Justice Roberts did not display an
“aggressive, line-drawing conservatism . . . bent on remaking great
swaths of Supreme Court precedent,”458 but instead applied judicial
restraint and “t[ook] one for the team.”459 With Justice Kennedy, the
usual swing vote, firmly in the camp to strike down the ACA,460
Chief Justice Roberts voted to uphold it,461 incensing conservatives
who considered themselves betrayed.462 By doing so, Chief Justice
Roberts demonstrated that the Court could operate “above-the-fray”
of partisan politics,463 thus preserving the Court’s legitimacy in the
eyes of the public and securing his own legacy as a brilliant strategist
in the process.464
A challenge to the Perrymander under Section 2, however,
would present Chief Justice Roberts with a choice of considerable
import. On the most basic level, he could finally address the
constitutional deficiencies he found in Section 2 during his time at
the Department of Justice and strike it down as unconstitutional.
Doing so would trigger challenges to redistricting plans drawn to
comply with Section 2 and invite more egregious partisan
gerrymandering to the detriment, even the retrenchment, of minority
voting rights, but at the risk of political fallout.465 On the other hand,
Chief Justice Roberts could uphold the last nationwide enforcement
provision in the VRA, enabling more Latinos and other minorities to
elect their preferred candidates in a state that may soon decide the
fate of his own political party—Texas. Either path he chooses may
457. Jeffrey Rosen, Second Opinions, NEW REPUBLIC (May 4, 2012), http://www
.newrepublic.com/article/politics/103090/magazine/conservative-judges-justices-supreme-court
-obama#.
458. See Toobin, supra note 400.
459. Franklin, supra note 452.
460. Id.
461. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
462. Ashby Jones & Brent Kendall, Roberts Straddles Ideological Divide, WALL ST. J.,
June 28, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303561504577494723149538
572.html.
463. Franklin, supra note 452.
464. Epps, supra note 456.
465. See Richard L. Hasen, If the Court Strikes Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, REUTERS:
GREAT DEBATE (Jan. 30, 2013, 4:48 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/01/30/ifthe-court-strikes-section-5-of-voting-rights-act.
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be interpreted as inherently political—to court minorities or to thwart
them, the same quandary the Republican Party currently faces as it
tries to avoid the fate of the Whig Party.466 Still, Chief Justice
Roberts has demonstrated an awareness of the partisanship that has
damaged the Court as well as a willingness to put the Court’s
legitimacy above his own personal politics.467 If he is willing to do
so again, perhaps Section 2 would not be doomed in the Roberts
Court after all.
On the other hand, if Chief Justice Roberts still considers
Section 2 to be “a sordid business, this divvying us up by race,”468
the Court may very well strike down or eviscerate the last of the
VRA. If it does, this Court would not be the first to retrench from
protecting minority voting rights.469 In 1876, the Supreme Court
under Chief Justice Morrison Waite narrowly construed
Reconstruction legislation according to his own personal legal
philosophy.470 In doing so, the Court “virtually gutted the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments,” setting back minority voting rights471
for almost a century until the VRA was finally passed in 1965.472
Before serving on the Court, Chief Justice Waite had been an
active member of the Whig Party.473

466. E.g., Draper, supra note 36; Lizza, supra note 19.
467. Franklin, supra note 452; Jones & Kendall, supra note 462.
468. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
469. J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 57, at 135, 163 (explaining that the end of the
First Reconstruction was brought about when “a racist Supreme Court overrode the clear intent of
Congress and the framers of the Reconstruction amendments in order to deny African Americans
an effective vote”).
470. Katz, supra note 59, at 2347–60; see Robert Dixon, Biography of Chief Justice Morrison
R. Waite, THE MORRISON R. WAITE AMERICAN INN OF THE COURT, http://www.waiteaic.org
/waitebio.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2013).
471. Davidson, supra note 58, at 10 (citing United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876)
and United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876)); Katz, supra note 59, at 2347–60; see Francisco
M. Ugarte, Reconstruction Redux: Rehnquist, Morrison, and the Civil Rights Cases, 41 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 485–88 (2006).
472. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed ninety-five years after the Fifteenth
Amendment guaranteed the right to vote, regardless of race, in 1870. Davidson, supra note 58, at
9, 17.
473. Waite, Morrison Remick, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES (Kermit L. Hall, ed., 2d ed., online version 2012), http://www.oxfordreference
.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195176612.001.0001/acref-9780195176612-e-1281.
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VI. CONCLUSION
“History can move backward.”
—Historian C. Vann Woodward, testifying before the
House Judiciary Subcommittee, when asked the lesson to be
learned from the First Reconstruction474
In light of a confluence of circumstances in both Congress and
the Supreme Court, Section 2 of the VRA may be at risk of being
either gutted or struck down. The polarization in Congress would
likely prevent a legislative override of any statutory holding in a
Section 2 case, making the Court’s interpretation essentially final.
Such an interpretation likely would not uphold Section 2 if the
current Court, as polarized as Congress, rules only according to its
members’ personal ideologies, as the Court is already perceived to
do. Chief Justice John Roberts may seize the chance to vindicate his
past efforts at the Justice Department by holding Section 2
unconstitutional. Or he may recognize the need for judicial restraint
on such a politically charged issue to preserve the Court’s legitimacy
in the public eye. His individual vote may be viewed, deservedly or
not, as a political move aligned with his party’s best interests: to
court minority voters by upholding a revered civil rights statute, or to
thwart them by invalidating one of the last protections of their
undiluted vote. If history is repeated, the loss of such protection
could take almost a century to regain, especially in light of the
increased partisan gerrymandering that would likely result from
invalidating or gutting Section 2. At a time when the minority vote’s
influence is becoming crucial to electoral outcomes, Chief Justice
Roberts may hold the future of Section 2—and his party—in his
hands.

474. Kousser, supra note 326, at 774.

